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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and Executive 
Function (EF). There has been debate on whether ToM and EF are two facets of the same 
process or are two distinct processes. Distinguishing between these possibilities empirically 
is challenging because the two abilities have similar developmental timetables and ToM tasks 
typically place high demands on EF, with the consequence that ToM and EF performance 
measures may be artificially correlated. Three experiments explored the nature of this 
relationship. Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether socio-cultural factors known to influence 
individual differences in EF (i.e., bilingualism, country-of-origin) extend to differences in 
ToM. If ToM and EF are two facets of the same process, then the pattern of differences in EF 
related to the socio-cultural factors and the pattern of differences in ToM should be 
comparable. Findings suggest that country-of-origin (but not language status) contributed to 
differences in EF (Experiment 1). In contrast, neither country-of-origin nor language status 
was associated with ToM (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 examined whether aging adults’ 
performance in ToM tasks improves when EF demands are reduced. The results 
demonstrated that older adults showed intact ToM despite their deficits in EF when reducing 
cognitive load in a ToM task, implying that correlations between ToM and EF performance 
may be artificially elevated. Implications of these findings for understanding the relationship 
between ToM and EF, and suggestions for future studies, are discussed. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
This dissertation examines the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM: the ability to 
understand others’ mind) and Executive Function (EF; a set of cognitive processes necessary 
for attaining a goal, including the abilities to control one’s attention, plan a strategy, and 
remember an instruction). It is unclear whether these two abilities stem from one process or 
are distinct processes. Progress on these issues is slow in part because EF and ToM develop 
on similar timelines and are measured using similar tasks. Three experiments addressed these 
issues. Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether individual differences in children’s EF related to 
socio-cultural factors (i.e., bilingualism and country-of-origin) extend to differences in ToM. 
Experiment 3 tested whether aging adults’ performance in a ToM task changed when EF 
demands of the task were reduced. Results from all three experiments suggest that EF and 
ToM are distinct processes. Experiments 1 and 2 found that Korean children, regardless of 
their language status, outperformed Caucasian counterparts on an EF task, but were 
indistinguishable from Caucasian children on a ToM task. Experiment 3 found that older 
adults’ performance in ToM improved when EF demands in the ToM measure were reduced. 
The results shed new light on a long-standing debate in Psychology.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction  
Across evolutionary history, there is a co-emergence of a variety of higher-order 
cognitive functions, including language, executive function (EF), social cognition, and 
symbolizing abilities. Together, this suite of cognitive functions distinguishes modern 
humans from non-human primates, including old/new world monkeys and great apes. 
Similarly, there is a rapid co-emergence of these cognitive functions in early childhood 
development. This raises challenging questions on the relationship between different 
cognitive domains, such as whether distinct cognitive functions co-emerge or one key 
domain (e.g., domain-general learning mechanism) emerges from which different 
cognitive functions develop.  
On one view, the human mind consists of distinct modules (domain-specificity), each 
shaped by natural selection and specialized for solving different adaptive problems 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). For example, ancestral human beings who had neural 
circuits that made them good at predicting what others want by using others’ eye 
direction would increase their probability of getting along well with other group 
members, and this would increase their probability of survival due to successful social 
interaction. In contrast, not having those neural circuits would increase the probability of 
individuals being excluded from a group, and this would decrease their probability of 
survival. Since neural circuits are passed on to offspring, there will be more individuals 
with these circuits in next generation. Over countless generations, these neural circuits 
become “mind-reading” modules that modern human beings currently have. Likewise, 
other cognitive functions, such as perception and language, have evolved to distinct 
modules so that we have a diversity of distinct modules. These distinct modules enable 
humans to readily pay more attention to some specific information relative to others to 
solve specific problems.  
An alternative view is that humans are equipped with domain-general (or domain-free) 
mechanisms that are applied to diverse problems. The ‘new thinking’ perspective 
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proposes that the mind is like “a multi-purpose instrument (Heyes, 2012, p.2092)” 
because the human mind is capable of performing a variety of both specific (e.g., mind-
reading; Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & Gopnik, 2012), and general tasks (e.g., 
problem-solving, planning; Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005).  
Are theory of mind (or mind-reading; hereafter, ToM), the ability to predict behaviour 
from inferred mental states, and executive function (EF), supported by distinct modules 
or are they based on a single domain-general process? The current work examines the 
relationship between ToM, especially false-belief reasoning, and EF. Although ToM and 
EF have been suggested to be highly associated with each other, whether ToM and EF are 
truly interrelated is still controversial. The main focus of the current work lies in 
providing a comprehensive overview of the relationship between ToM and EF and a 
greater understanding of the relationship via empirical research. 
In the following sections, prior literature on ToM, EF, and the relationship between ToM 
and EF is reviewed. 
1.1 Theory of Mind 
Theory of Mind refers to the ability to understand others’ mental states, such as beliefs, 
wishes, intentions, knowledge, desires, and so on, in order to predict their behavior even 
if their mental states are different from our own. Since such states are not observable but 
enable individual to make predictions based on the inference of the mental states, it has 
been viewed as a theory (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  
False-belief understanding, one of the dimensions of ToM and the focus of the current 
work, is more dependent on higher-order social cognitive abilities than other dimensions 
of ToM (i.e., emotion or desire understanding). For example, desire understanding simply 
involves recognizing another person’s subjective attitude toward the world. Successful 
false-belief understanding, however, requires that an individual realizes that: (1) another 
person has a representation of the world; and (2) the contents of the others’ representation 
may reflect reality or may be different from the reality (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001). Thus, false-belief understanding is generally considered a higher-order form of 
3 
 
ToM reasoning and is often used as a marker of ToM development (Carlson, Moses, & 
Hix, 1998a; Devine & Hughes, 2018; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008).  
One task frequently used to measure false-belief understanding in children is a “change-
in-location” false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In one popular variant, the 
“Sally-Anne task”, a child participant with a story about two characters (Sally and Ann) 
who know that a ball is in a basket. During Sally’s absence, Ann moves the ball from the 
basket to a box. The critical question is where Sally will look for the ball when she comes 
back. To correctly answer the question, children need to distinguish between their own 
true belief about the location of the ball and Sally’s false belief that the ball is still located 
in the basket. Another widely used false-belief understanding task is the “unexpected-
contents” false-belief task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). In a popular variant, the 
“Smarties task”, a child is shown a candy box (i.e., “Smarties”), but then discovers upon 
opening it that the box actually has unexpected contents (e.g., crayons) instead of 
expected contents (i.e., smarties). After closing the box, the child is asked about what 
another person ‘X’ who has not seen inside the box would think is inside it. Since X does 
not know that the box actually contains crayons, X would falsely believe that the candy 
box contained candies as it appears. 
Four- and five-year-old children often give correct answers to the critical questions in 
false-belief tasks, whereas younger children give answers corresponding to their own 
beliefs or reality, rather than another person’s belief (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Preschool-aged children show consistent and robust 
development of false-belief understanding, irrespective of ToM task types and countries 
of origin (Wellman et al., 2001). The development of false-belief understanding 
continues and becomes increasingly complex through adolescence and young adulthood 
(Blakemore, 2012; Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). 
At the other end of the lifespan, the ability to understand others’ false beliefs typically 
declines (but see Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 
2002; Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, & Archibald, 2000 for exceptions). For example, in one 
of the typically used false-belief tasks for adults (a modified version of the “change-in-
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location” false-belief task for children), adults are presented with a story or video 
demonstrating a protagonist’s false-belief or true-belief/the reality of a situation. For 
example, the protagonist sees that an object is located in Location A. The object is then 
moved to Location B during the protagonist’s absence (false-belief condition) or presence 
(true-belief condition). Adult participants are then asked to predict where the protagonist 
would look for the object. The correct answer depends on conditions (i.e., false-belief 
condition: Location A; true-belief condition: Location B). Older adults made more errors 
in the false-belief condition compared to young adults, whereas, in the control condition 
that did not involve any mentalizing skills, they made fewer errors (Bailey & Henry, 
2008) or they did not differ in performance from young adults (German & Hehman, 
2006; Phillips et al., 2011). This is surprising given that older adults have accumulated 
considerable social experience and wisdom (Randall, 2013; Tentori, Osherson, Hasher, & 
May, 2001). One possibility is that age-related ToM decline is linked to the deterioration 
of EF (German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011). Questions concerning the 
relationship between ToM (specifically, false-belief understanding) and EF in older 
adults will be addressed in detail in section 1.3. 
In conclusion, false-belief understanding follows an inverted U-shape across the lifespan. 
It rapidly develops between the ages of 3- and 5-years, continues to develop through 
adolescence and early adulthood, and then declines in late adulthood. This developmental 
trajectory is very similar to that of EF (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & 
Breton, 2002; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Hughes & Ensor, 2005), suggesting perhaps 
that ToM and EF are fundamentally linked.  
1.2 Executive Function 
Executive function (EF) is an umbrella term that refers to a set of cognitive processes that 
support goal-directed behaviour (Baddeley, 1996; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), including 
working memory, planning, inhibitory control, attention, and shifting.  
Different tasks are used to measure EF of individuals of different ages. One task used to 
measure EF in children is the day/night Stroop task (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994). 
In this task, children are shown two cards, one white card with a sun drawn on it and a 
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second black card with a moon drawn on it. They are then instructed to say “day” for the 
moon card and “night” for the sun card. Similarly, in Luria’s hand game (Luria, Pribram, 
& Homskaya, 1964), children first learn two different hand gestures (e.g., making a fist 
and pointing with an index finger). They are then instructed to make the opposite gesture 
to the experimenter’s gesture (e.g., when the experimenter makes a fist, the children need 
to point with a finger). These two tasks are considered measures of response inhibition 
because they require children to inhibit a prepotent response in favour of an alternative 
behaviour. Another common task for measuring EF in young children is the Dimensional 
Change Card Sort task (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006). In this task, children are presented with 
two boxes, each marked with a bidimensional target (e.g., a red rabbit and a blue truck). 
In pre-switch trials, children begin by sorting test cards that match each of the targets on 
a single dimension (i.e., blue rabbits and red trucks) according to one dimension (e.g., 
colour; all the red cards should go into the box with a red rabbit and all the blue cards 
should go into the box with a blue truck). Following 5 to 10 pre-switch trials, children are 
instructed to switch and sort the cards by the second dimension (e.g., shape; all the rabbit 
cards should go into the box with a red rabbit and all the truck cards should go into the 
box with a blue truck). The post-switch, therefore, requires children to inhibit the use of 
an old rule and shift and use a new rule.  
For adolescents and adults, one commonly used measure of EF is the Stroop task. In the 
task, participants are given a list of words (e.g., red, blue, green, and so on) and are 
instructed to not read the words but instead name the colour of the font. In some cases, 
the colour of the words is matched with the meaning of the words (e.g., the word ‘red’ 
written in red) and in other cases, the colour of the words is mismatched with meaning 
(e.g., the word ‘blue’ written in red). The former cases refer to congruent trials and the 
latter cases refer to incongruent trials. Participants are typically faster and show more 
accurate on congruent trials compared to incongruent trials (Jensen & Rohwer, 1966; 
MacLeod, 1991) possibly because incongruent trials require over-practiced word reading 
to be inhibited in favour of color naming. One representative task for measuring working 
memory capacity is the memory span task. In this task, participants are presented with a 
list of items (including letters or numbers) and they are then asked to recall the items in 
correct order (forward) or in reverse order (backward). The highest number of correctly 
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recalled items is considered as individual’s working memory span. Finally, one common 
measure of adults’ flexibility is the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST; Grant & Berg, 
1948). In the WCST, participants are asked to sort cards with diverse symbols according 
to either colour, shape, or the number of the symbols. The only feedback available to 
participants is whether each match they make is correct or not so that participants have to 
infer how to match the cards correctly based on the feedback and change their strategy 
when a specific match is incorrect.  
With these various EF tasks, it has been found that EF rapidly improves in preschool-
aged children (Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Hughes, 1998) as they age. For example, 
children aged between 3 and 5 years show rapid development of EF even after controlling 
for verbal ability (Carlson, 2005). EF continues to develop through elementary school age 
and adolescence. During elementary school years, children show marked improvement in 
working memory (Siegel, 1994) and set-shifting (Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather, 
2001; Rosselli & Ardila, 1993). For example, children show sharp improvement in 
various working memory span tasks between the ages of 4 ½- and 8-years and gradual 
improvement after the ages of 10 years (Case, 1992). In addition, elementary school 
children become progressively insightful about their own mental processing and can exert 
greater conscious control over their thoughts and actions (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 
2000).  
During adolescence, EF continuously and gradually develops (Huizinga, Dolan, & van 
der Molen, 2006; Kleibeuker, De Dreu, & Crone, 2013; Peters, Van Duijvenvoorde, 
Koolschijn, & Crone, 2016). For example, working memory develops until the age of 21 
and set-shifting and inhibition develops until the age of 15 (Huizinga et al., 2006). 
Although EF subcomponents seem to show different developmental courses, EF reaches 
its peak during adolescence. Through adulthood, EF performance stabilizes (Peters et al., 
2016) or even slightly decreases (e.g., on divergent thinking tasks, Kleibeuker, De Dreu, 
& Crone, 2013; on spatial divergent tasks, Kleibeuker, Koolschijn, et al., 2013). One 
reason why EF development may be so protracted is that the prefrontal cortex (PFC), an 
area of the brain associated with executive functioning, is slow to develop. Like EF, the 
PFC continues to develop until early adulthood (Crone, Donohue, Honomichl, 
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Wendelken, & Bunge, 2006; Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997; Moriguchi & Hiraki, 
2013; Morton, Bosma, & Ansari, 2009).    
In late-adulthood, although people vary substantially in cognitive aging (Cabeza, 
Anderson, Locantore, & McIntosh, 2002; Rosen et al., 2002), in general, aging is 
associated with a decline in EF. Older adults show deficits on attentional tasks (e.g., 
showing larger cost effects of dividing attention during a dual task, McDowd & Craik, 
1988; Verhaeghen, Steitz, Sliwinski, & Cerella, 2003), working memory tasks (Salthouse 
& Babcock, 1991), and inhibitory control tasks (e.g., showing slower reaction times to 
target stimuli while ignoring irrelevant stimuli, McDowd & Shaw, 2000; West, 2004). As 
mentioned earlier, structural and functional changes in the PFC that occur with age (e.g., 
cortical thinning in the PFC with age, age-related changes in the PFC activity) may play a 
role in age-related decline of EF (Burzynska et al., 2012; Chao & Knight, 1997; Rypma 
& D’Esposito, 2000; West, 1996).  
In sum, EF rapidly develop in childhood, and some of EF subcomponents (i.e., inhibition, 
shifting) mature and stabilize in early adolescence, whereas other EF subcomponents 
(i.e., working memory) continue to develop into early adulthood. As seniors age, the 
opposite pattern is observed, with prominent age-related decline in across multiple 
domains of EF. Thus, the development of EF follows an inverted U-shape, similar to the 
developmental course of ToM.  
1.3 The relationship between Theory of Mind and Executive 
Function 
The fact that ToM and EF follow similar developmental trajectories suggests that these 
abilities may be closely related. One possibility is that ToM and EF both rely on use of 
the same higher-order representations. For example, Cognitive Complexity and Control 
theory (Frye, Zelazo, & Burack, 1998) stipulates that ToM, especially false-belief 
understanding, is simply one form of a domain-general reasoning skill involving use of 
higher-order rules. For example, in the “change-in-location” false-belief task, one is able 
to predict where another person will look for an object using if-if-then rules, without 
inferring his/her mental states (e.g., “if he/she saw that the object was located in a box A, 
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if  he/she did not see that the change of the object’s location (from the box A to a box B), 
then the box A”). Thus, false-belief understanding may involve use of general higher-
order rules that are not unique reasoning about mental states.  
An alternative possibility is that ToM and EF are grounded in common domain-general 
working memory and inhibitory control processes (Moses, 2001). For example, in false-
belief tasks, one has to suppress salient information regarding reality or one’s 
perspective/belief (inhibitory control) and hold in mind not only one’s own mental state 
but the mental state of another person (working memory). Thus, EF has been proposed to 
be closely related to ToM. 
Empirically, ToM and EF are often correlated. For example, preschoolers’ performance 
on false-belief tasks and EF tasks are correlated even when age, gender, and verbal ability 
are partialled out (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995). Although there are mixed 
results on the direction of the relationship with a longitudinal study design (e.g., early EF 
predicts later false-belief understanding: Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Ensor, 2007 vs. early 
ToM including false-belief understanding predicts later EF: McAlister & Peterson, 2013), 
the results suggest a close association between ToM and EF. A strong link between ToM 
(specifically, false belief understanding) and EF has also been found in middle childhood 
(children aged 6-11 years; Austin, Groppe, & Elsner, 2014; Devine et al., 2016). 
Relatedly, ToM and EF appear inter-related in children with autism. For example, autistic 
children show deficits on not only ToM tasks but EF tasks (Ozonoff, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 1991; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1990), and the developmental trajectories of ToM 
and EF in autistic children are similar (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994).  
The strong relationship between false-belief understanding and EF can also be found in 
adulthood. It has been suggested that the age-related deterioration of false-belief 
understanding is associated with the decline of EF. For example, adults’ performance on 
a false-belief task is significantly correlated with EF, specifically, working memory, 
inhibitory control, and speed of processing (German & Hehman, 2006). Indeed, there is 
evidence that EF statistically mediates the age-related decline of ToM (Bailey & Henry, 
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2008; Charlton, Barrick, Markus, & Morris, 2009; Phillips et al., 2011). These findings 
are suggestive of a highly interdependent relationship between ToM and EF.  
Regarding how EF relates to ToM, two general possibilities have been proposed (Carlson 
& Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002), but there have been controversies over it. 
According to emergence account, EF is necessary for the emergence of ToM ability so 
that EF is required for children to understand mental state concepts, such as beliefs, 
wishes, and intentions. Empirically, there is evidence supporting this account in that early 
EF predicts later false-belief understanding (Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Ensor, 2007) 
despite the empirical results favouring the opposite pattern (i.e., early ToM predicts later 
EF; McAlister & Peterson, 2013). On the other hand, expression account posits that EF is 
necessary to display one’s mentalizing ability. According to this account, children 
already have ToM competence, but the EF demands that a ToM task requires to perform 
may impede their successful performance on a ToM task. The evidence showing that 
children’s performance on a ToM task increased when the inhibitory control demands 
that the ToM task imposes were reduced (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998b) seems to favour 
the expression account. Another piece of evidence, however, is inconsistent with the 
expression account in that lowering EF demands of ToM tasks did not influence 
children’s performance (Wellman et al., 2001). Thus, it is still unclear on how ToM and 
EF relate to each other. 
At the same time, it has been proposed that ToM and EF are distinct processes. 
According to one evolutionary theory (Tooby & Cosmides, 1997), ToM is supported by a 
module dedicated to solving specific social cognition problems. In this account, over 
successive generations, the human social environment puts evolutionary pressure on the 
individual’s capacity to solve social challenges (e.g., identifying others who would 
cooperate and who would cheat; Cosmides, 1989; Trivers, 1971), which has evolved into 
a ToM module.  
Empirically, considerable evidence suggests that ToM and EF are distinct. For example, 
autistic children show deficits in ToM tasks, but not in control tasks that involve non-
mental reasoning but require similar EF loads to ToM tasks (Charman & Baron‐Cohen, 
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1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), implying that ToM is a specialized and independent 
module. In addition, neuroimaging studies (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe, Schulz, & 
Jiang, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005) identify the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) as 
a brain area uniquely engaged by mentalizing tasks. Thus, given the inconsistent findings 
on the relationship between ToM and EF, it is uncertain whether the two abilities are 
based on one common process or are distinct processes. 
1.4 Empirical challenges to testing the nature of the 
relationship between Theory of Mind and Executive 
Function 
ToM and EF have similar developmental timetables. However, it is unclear whether the 
close co-development of ToM and EF is merely coincidental or indicative of a close 
fundamental link. Making matters more complicated, tasks used to study ToM in children 
and adults typically place high demands on EF, with the consequence that ToM and EF 
might appear to be correlated due to methodological artifacts. For example, in standard 
false-belief tasks (in other words, elicited-response or explicit false-belief tasks), 
participants have to provide a verbal response indicating another person’s belief. 
Consequently, these types of tasks impose high cognitive demands (i.e., inhibiting a 
prepotent response, generating an explicit response), leading to increased similarity 
between ToM and EF performance measures. It is conceivable, therefore, that ToM and 
EF are statistically correlated but not causally associated. 
1.5 The current work’s research questions 
The purpose of the current work is to examine whether ToM and EF are rooted in a 
common process or whether they are distinct processes. In an effort to lend clarity to this 
debate, two experiments examined individual differences in ToM and EF in the preschool 
period. In Experiments 1 and 2, the relation between ToM and EF was examined by 
testing whether socio-cultural factors known to impact differences in EF extend to 
differences in ToM. Language status and country-of-origin have been proposed as socio-
cultural factors known to influence individual’s EF. For example, there is evidence 
suggesting that: (1) bilingual children are advantaged in EF compared to monolingual 
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children (language status; Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Carlson & 
Meltzoff, 2008); and (2) children from East Asian countries make fewer errors in EF 
tasks compared to Caucasian children from Western countries, like Europe and North 
America (country-of-origin; Oh & Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 
2006). Thus, Experiment 1 tested the effects of language status and country-of-origin on 
EF. To that end, the performance of bilingual and monolingual preschool-aged children 
of varied national origin on an age-appropriate inhibitory control task was compared. 
Experiment 2 then tested whether effects of language status and country-of-origin 
(reported in Experiment 1) are observed in ToM.   
If ToM and EF are based on a common process, then language status and culture should 
exert similar effects on EF and ToM. In other words, the pattern of results for EF due to 
the socio-cultural factors (Experiment 1) and the pattern of results for ToM (Experiment 
2) are expected to be similar. However, if ToM and EF are distinct processes, then the 
effects of language status and country-of-origin on EF shown in Experiment 1 should not 
extend to ToM.  
Experiment 3 examined whether aging adults with declining EF show impairment in 
ToM when tested using a ToM task that places fewer demands on EF. To that end, 
younger and older adults were compared on a spontaneous-response (or implicit) ToM 
task that imposes fewer demands on EF (Scott, 2017). For example, in spontaneous-
response tasks, participants are not required to explicitly generate verbal responses, but 
reveal mental state evaluations through spontaneous actions such as looking behaviours 
and spontaneous helping behaviours. Therefore, Experiment 3 explored whether older 
adults who are experiencing age-related decline of EF show difficulty in belief-tracking 
when tested with a ToM task that places fewer demands on EF resources.  
If ToM and EF are based on a common process, then reducing cognitive load required for 
performing a ToM task should be of no effect on the nature of the relationship between 
ToM and EF. Therefore, it is predicted that older adults believed to be experiencing age-
related decline in EF should show deficits in belief-tracking even when using a 
spontaneous-response ToM task. However, if ToM and EF are distinct processes (but 
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performance between ToM task and EF task are simply artificially correlated due to 
methodological artifacts), then the attempt to lower cognitive demands for performing a 
ToM task should lead to dissociation between ToM and EF in older adults. In other 
words, it is expected that older adults would show impairment in EF, but not in belief-
tracking, implying that the strong relationship between ToM and EF reported in the 
existing studies is simply due to high cognitive loads that ToM ‘tasks’ require to perform. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follow. Chapter 2 (Experiment 1) 
explored the effects of socio-cultural factors (i.e., language status and country-of-origin) 
on EF. Chapter 3 (Experiment 2) examined whether socio-cultural effects on EF observed 
in Chapter 2 (Experiment 1) extend to ToM. Chapter 4 is for integrating and summarizing 
the results from Experiments 1 and 2. Chapter 5 (Experiment 3) explored whether 
reducing the cognitive demands of ToM tasks influences the relationship between ToM 
and EF. Chapter 6 discussed the results from the Experiments 1 to 3 with suggesting 
implications and future research in ToM and EF. 
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Chapter 2  
2 The effects of individual difference in language status 
and country of origin on executive function 
Four- to five-year-old children have difficulty inhibiting prepotent behaviours (Diamond, 
2002). In modified Stroop tasks (Gerstadt et al., 1994), children are presented two images 
(e.g., a drawing of the sun and a drawing of the moon) and instructed to select the image 
that is weakly associated with a word (e.g., select the image of the moon in response to 
the word “day”). Young children typically err by selecting the image that is strongly 
associated with the word (e.g., a picture of the sun). Age-related advances in response 
inhibition occur throughout this period and are considered part of normative cognitive 
development (Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Morton & Munakata, 2002; Zelazo, 
Frye, & Rapus, 1996).  
Interestingly, there is evidence that young children who grow up speaking two languages 
are advantaged in response inhibition tasks compared to children who grow up speaking 
one language (Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Bialystok & Senman, 2004). In one landmark 
study, Bialystok (1999) administered an inhibitory control task to Chinese-English 
bilingual and English monolingual preschool-aged children. Bilingual children exhibited 
greater inhibition than monolingual children in that they were better able to suspend use 
of an initial sorting strategy and replace it with another. Response inhibition advantages 
favouring bilingual children have since been observed in a range of different tasks 
(Bialystok, 2010; Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Carlson & Meltzoff, 2008).  
According to the prevailing interpretation (Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok, Klein, Craik, & 
Viswanathan, 2004), bilingual children’s advantage in inhibitory control is linked to their 
experience managing two languages in daily life. On this view, continued experience 
exercising control in this way leads to improvements in inhibition that, in turn, generalize 
to problems outside the domain of language via domain-general control processes.  
Whether differences in young bilingual and monolingual children’s inhibitory control are 
uniquely attributable to differences in language status is, however, hotly debated. Indeed, 
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several recent studies reported no association between language status and children’s 
inhibitory control (Dick et al., 2018; Duñabeitia et al., 2014), raising questions about the 
basis of previously reported language status effects favouring bilingual children.  
One possibility – and the focus of the current study – is that performance differences 
previously attributed to the effects of language status may actually reflect the influence of 
uncontrolled confounding factors (Hartanto & Yang, 2019; Morton & Harper, 2009; 
Yang, Yang, & Lust, 2011). In Bialystok’s (1999) landmark comparison of Chinese-
English and English-speaking children, for example, group differences in inhibitory 
control were attributed to the effects of language status. Logically, however, reported 
group differences could have been attributed to differences in the country of origin of 
these children and their families. Indeed, children from East Asian countries, like Korea, 
make fewer errors in inhibition tasks than do Caucasian children from western nations, 
like Canada (Oh & Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006), perhaps 
because of differences in their respective collectivist and individualist cultures (Clarke-
Stewart, Lee, Allhusen, Kim, & McDowell, 2006; Hofstede, 1980). Therefore, to address 
this possibility, the current work was conducted.  
In the current study, to disentangle confounded language status and country-of-origin 
explanations of the bilingual advantage, Korean monolingual kindergartners from Seoul, 
South Korea, Korean-English bilingual and English monolingual kindergarteners from 
Ontario, Canada were administered a modified Stroop task including congruent and 
incongruent trials. Our predictions were as follows. If the effect of language status on 
children’s inhibitory control only exists, then Korean-English bilingual children should 
show higher accuracy on incongruent trials than Canadian English monolingual and 
Korean monolingual children. If there is the effect of country-of-origin only, then Korean 
children, irrespective of their language status, should demonstrate higher accuracy on 
incongruent trials compared to Canadian English monolingual children. If there are the 
effects of language status and country-of-origin on children’s inhibitory control, Korean-
English bilingual children would make fewer errors on incongruent trials compared to 
Korean monolingual children, who would be expected to make fewer errors than 
Canadian English monolingual children, but all the three groups would perform 
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comparably on congruent trials. Furthermore, to better understand possible country-of-
origin differences in children’s inhibitory control, survey measures of cultural values 
(Individualism-Collectivism) and parenting attitudes (authoritarian and authoritative) 
were obtained from parents of all children. 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants 
Participants included 112 children aged between 3.5 and 5.5 years of age. This sample 
consisted of 36 Caucasian English monolingual speakers living in Ontario, Canada; 43 
Korean monolingual speakers living in and around Seoul, Korea; and 33 Korean-English 
bilingual speakers living in Ontario, Canada. Of these 112 children, 3 were excluded 
from the analysis. These included two English monolingual children whose parents were 
not Caucasian, and one bilingual child whose parent classified them as monolingual. An 
additional 10 children had to be dropped for various reasons including: experimenter 
error (one Korean monolingual child); computer failure (one Korean monolingual child); 
incomplete Stroop data (one Korean monolingual child), and early withdrawal of 
participation1 (seven Korean monolinguals). Thus, the final sample consisted of 99 
children, and included 34 English monolinguals who lived in Canada and whose mother 
and father were Caucasian (18 females, Mage = 4.44 years, SD = 0.50), 33 Korean 
monolinguals who lived in Korean and whose mother and father were Korean (18 
females, Mage = 4.30 years, SD = 0.57), and 32 Korean-English bilinguals who lived in 
Canada and whose mother and father were Korean (13 females, Mage = 4.71 years, SD = 
0.58). Groups differed in age, F (2, 96) = 4.70, p = .011, with Korean-English bilinguals 
older than Korean monolinguals (p = .01), but no difference between English 
monolinguals and Korean-English bilinguals (p = .140) nor between English 
 
1
 All seven Korean monolingual children withdrew from the study during the PPVT due to boredom. Since 
the Korean PPVT-R was conducted using a pencil-and-paper version whereas the English PPVT-4 was 
conducted using a tablet, it is assumed that the unequal data attrition among the groups is caused by the 
difference in methods of administering the PPVTs.   
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monolinguals and Korean monolinguals (p = .917). This study was approved by Human 
Research Ethics board at Western University and Yonsei University (see Appendix A).  
2.1.2 Tasks and measures 
2.1.2.1 Language status 
Bilingual/monolingual language status was assessed in two ways.  First, children were 
administered the English (and/or Korean) version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Tests 
(PPVT; English version of the PPVT - fourth edition, Dunn & Dunn, 2007; Korean version 
of the PPVT-Revised, Kim, Chang, Yim, & Beak, 1995), a standardized assessment of 
receptive vocabulary. Second, parents completed a daily language use survey on behalf of 
their children (Bialystok, 2010). The survey solicited information about children’s daily 
language use in various contexts (e.g., with family, with friends, at preschool/daycare, 
when watching TV/movies, and when counting or doing math)2. Scores ranged from 1 
(only his/her first language) to 5 (only his/her other language) for all questions. Parents 
were also asked to report the proportion of each day their child used their first language on 
average (see Appendix B).  
2.1.2.2 Socio-economic status 
Socio-economic status (SES) was assessed by means of a survey administered to parents 
(see Appendix B). The survey solicited information about the family’s social and 
economic position in their local society, including the parent’s subjective perception of 
their family’s relative income level  (i.e., compared to other families in the country you 
live in,  your family income level is 1: not very much – 5: very wealthy), and paternal and 
maternal education level (1: No education, 2: Elementary, 3: High school, 4: 
College/professional school, 5: Undergraduate, 6: Graduate or Medicine). 
 
2
 Due to experimenter error, Korean monolinguals’ language use when watching TV/movies and when 
counting/doing math was not measured. 
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2.1.2.3 Individualism-Collectivism  
Parental cultural value orientation was assessed using Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) 
Individualism-Collectivism Scale (INDCOL; see Appendix C). The INDCOL Scale has 
27 items that measures 4 different subscales: Horizontal Individualism (HI; 5 items), 
which reflects how much an individual values social autonomy; Horizontal Collectivism 
(HC; 8 items), which reflects how much an individual values social interdependence; 
Vertical Individualism (VI; 8 items) which measures how much an individual values 
opportunities for distinction; and Vertical Collectivism (VC; 6 items), which reflects how 
much an individual accepts social hierarchy and collective decision making. Parents 
responded to each the 27 items using a 9-point scale (1: Never or definitely no – 9: 
Always or definitely yes). 
2.1.2.4 Authoritative and Authoritarian Parenting Attitudes 
Parental child-rearing attitudes was assessed by means of the short version of Block 
(1981)’s Child-rearing Practices Report (CRPR; see Appendix D). Parents answered each 
of the 68 survey items using a 5-point Likert scale (1: Strongly agree – 5: Strongly 
disagree). Following the method of Kochanska, Kuczynski, & Radke-yarrow (1989), 
authoritarian parenting attitudes were estimated from items measuring punishment 
orientation, high power parenting/control, and parental rejection, whereas authoritative 
parenting attitudes were estimated from items measuring parental acceptance, 
encouragement of independence/achievement, and low power parenting/induction. 
2.1.2.5 Inhibitory control 
Inhibitory control was measured by means of an age-appropriate modified colour-word 
Stroop task. The task was administered on a touch-screen tablet (ASUS Transformer 
Mini T102H tablet) running custom software implemented in Python using PsychoPy 
version. 1.85.6 (Peirce, 2009). Each trial presented two ellipses, one red and one blue. On 
half of the trials, the red ellipse appeared on the left; on half of the trials, it appeared on 
the right. The relative position of the two ellipses switched randomly from trial and to 
trial. Trials began with a white fixation cross, followed one second later by the two 
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coloured ellipses, followed 500ms later by an audio recording of the word “red” or 
“blue.” Ellipses remained visible until the participant made a response. On incongruent 
trials, children were instructed to touch the blue (or red) circle when they heard the word 
“red” (or “blue.”) On congruent trials, children were instructed to touch the blue (or red) 
circle when they heard the word “blue” (or “red.”) The entire task consisted of 1 block of 
12 incongruent trials (6 with the word “red” and 6 with the word “blue”) followed by one 
block of 12 congruent trials (6 with the word “red” and 6 with the word “blue”), with the 
order of trials within blocks randomized for each participant but block order fixed for all 
participants. To ensure children fully understood the rules for each trial type, each block 
started only after children responded correctly to two practice trials. On every trial, the 
tablet recorded the accuracy and latency of participant responses.   
2.1.3 Procedure 
Parents provided informed and written consent to their own and their child’s 
participation, and children provided verbal assent to their participation. Children were 
tested individually by trained research assistants in one session that lasted approximately 
30-40 minutes. The full protocol included additional measures not reported here that were 
administered as part of a larger cross-cultural study of kindergarteners’ social cognition. 
English (or Korean) monolingual children were tested in a child development laboratory 
in Ontario Canada (or Seoul South Korea) by native English speakers (or a native Korean 
speaker). Korean-English bilingual children were tested in Ontario Canada in a quiet 
room in a local church by Korean-English bilingual speakers.  
Two steps were taken to avoid inconsistencies in the administration of the protocol across 
experimenters and settings. First, all experimenters adhered to a common script that 
included a fixed set of task instructions for each component of the protocol. The script 
and survey measures were translated from English into Korean, and then back-translated 
into English, and corrected for inconsistencies. Second, English and Korean versions of 
the modified Stroop task that served as the core measure of children’s inhibitory control 
were implemented on touch-screen tablet computers (shipped from Canada to South 
Korea) and used for all testing.  
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Task order was pseudo-randomized across participants, and breaks were provided as 
needed. To avoid unnecessary test burden, Korean-English bilinguals were administered 
the English version of the PPVT at the beginning of testing and the Korean version of the 
PPVT at the end of testing. Parents completed the surveys in a private space as their 
children were tested nearby. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Language status 
Missing data included one Korean-English bilingual participant’s Korean receptive 
vocabulary score (the child did not complete the test), one Korean-English bilingual 
participant’s English vocabulary score (computer failed to save the data), and one 
Korean-English bilingual child’s daily language use survey score (parent did not 
complete the survey). Descriptive statistics for receptive vocabulary and daily language 
use are reported in Table 1 and confirmed that monolingual and bilingual children 
showed daily language use and proficiency in one and two languages respectively.  
2.2.2 Socio-economic status 
Missing data included measures of perceived SES from two parents (one Caucasian 
Canadian parent, one Korean parent living in Korea), measures of paternal education 
level from four parents (two Caucasian Canadian parents and two Korean parents living 
in Korea), and measures of maternal education level from one parent (one Korean parent 
living in Korea). Data were missing either because the parent was single or refused to 
report. SES measures for the separate groups are reported in Table 1. Separate one-way 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) with group as a between-subjects factor confirmed no 
difference between groups in perceived relative economic status (p = .762) and maternal 
educational level (p = .270). Paternal education level, however, differed for the three 
groups, F (2, 92) = 3.94, p = .023, ηp
2  = .079, being slightly higher for fathers of Korean-
English bilingual children compared to fathers of English monolingual children (p = 
.020). There was no difference in the education level of fathers of English and Korean 
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monolinguals (p = .272) nor in the education level of fathers of Korean monolinguals and 
Korean-English bilinguals (p = .891). In sum, groups were of comparable SES. 
 
Table 1. Participants’ means (and standard deviations) of daily language use, Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Tests (PPVT) scores, and socio-economic background questionnaire 
Variable 
Language group 
English 
monolingual 
Korean-English 
bilingual 
Korean 
monolingual 
Daily L1 (child’s First language) Use 
With their family 1.00 (0) 2.41 (0.84) 1.15 (0.36) 
With their friends 1.00 (0) 3.00 (0.95) 1.09 (0.29) 
At preschool/ daycare 1.00 (0) 4.16 (1.11) 1.27 (0.57) 
Watching TV/movie 1.12 (0.33) 3.09 (0.78) - 
Counting/doing math 1.06 (0.24) 3.47 (0.80) - 
Proportion of L1 use (%) 99.88 (0.48) 54.84 (21.11) 97.09 (4.77) 
PPVT raw Scores 
PPVT-4: Eng. 85.91 (21.39) 56.48 (19.85) - 
PPVT-R: Kor. - 35.48 (15.86) 52.52 (22.02) 
Socio-economic Background Questionnaire 
Subjective SES 3.09 (0.72) 3.00 (0.76) 3.13 (0.61) 
Paternal education 4.41 (0.80) 5.00 (0.84) 4.77 (0.92) 
Maternal education 4.71 (0.80) 5.00 (0.57) 4.78 (0.87) 
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2.2.3 Inhibitory control 
As is typical of 4- to 5-year-old children, 77% of the participants were either 
systematically correct (61% of the participants showed above 80% accuracy) or 
systematically incorrect (16% of the participants showed below 20% accuracy) on 
incongruent trials of the modified Stroop task, limiting the number observations required 
for response time analysis. Analysis therefore focused on accuracy.  
We sought to disentangle language status and country-of-origin interpretations that are 
confounded in the previous literature. For this, we compared Korean monolingual 
children’s Stroop task performance with that of Korean-English bilingual and English 
monolingual children (see Figure 1). All three groups showed a high rate of accuracy on 
congruent trials (Korean monolingual group: M = 80.81, SD = 33.56); however Korean 
monolingual (M = 92.68, SD = 12.97) and Korean-English bilingual children showed 
higher accuracy on incongruent trials than did English monolingual children. A 3 Group 
(Korean monolingual, Korean-English bilingual, English monolingual) x 2 Condition 
(incongruent versus congruent) mixed ANOVA confirmed a significant interaction of 
Group and Condition, F (2, 96) = 5.02, p = .008, ηp
2  = .095, which remained significant 
after controlling for group differences in age, F (2, 95) = 5.14, p = .008, ηp
2  = .098. To 
identify the source of the interaction, we performed two one-way ANOVAs, one that 
examined the effect of Group on congruent trial accuracy, and a second that examined the 
effect of Group on incongruent trial accuracy. There was no effect of Group on congruent 
trial performance, F (2, 96) = 0.13, p = .876, but there was a significant effect of Group 
on incongruent trial performance, F (2, 96) = 6.31, p = .003, ηp
2  = .116. Bonferroni-
corrected pairwise comparisons confirmed both Korean monolinguals and Korean-
English bilinguals had higher accuracy on incongruent trials than English monolinguals 
(p = .007 and p = .011 respectively), but did not differ from each other (p = 1.000).   
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Figure 1. Mean accuracy in each condition during the Red-Blue Stroop task. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
2.2.4 Individualism-Collectivism 
The reliability statistics (Cronbach’s α) for the four subscales from the INDCOL scales 
are .629 (HI), .785 (VI), .759 (HC), and .528 (VC), respectively, indicating high internal 
consistency for VI and HC, acceptable consistency for HI, but questionable consistency 
for VC.  
Group means and standard deviations of the four subscales from the INDCOL scales are 
shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. Groups means were comparable for VC, F (2, 96) = 1.95, 
p = .148, and HI, F (2, 96) = 1.01, p = .368, but differed slightly for both VI, F (2, 96) = 
5.43, p = .006, ηp
2= .102, and HC, F (2, 96) = 4.87, p = .010, ηp
2= .092. Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc tests confirmed that Korean parents living in Canada and those living 
in Korea had significantly higher VI scores than did Canadian parents, p = .010 and p = 
.029, respectively, but did not differ from each other (p = 1.000). As well, Korean parents 
living in Korea had significantly lower HC scores compared to both the Korean parents 
living in Canada (p = .038) and Canadian parents (p = .016), who did not differ from each 
other (p = 1.000). 
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Table 2. Parents’ means (and standard deviations) of scores for Individualism-
Collectivism Scale (INDCOL) and Child-Rearing Practices Report (CRPR) per each sub-
scale. 
 
English 
monolingual 
Korean-
English 
bilingual 
Korean 
monolingual 
INDCOL 
Horizontal 
Individualism 
6.38 (1.11) 6.19 (1.33) 6.60 (1.01) 
Vertical Individualism 4.43 (1.38) 5.29 (1.02) 5.17 (1.03) 
Horizontal Collectivism 7.17 (0.78) 7.11 (1.11) 6.47 (1.08) 
Vertical Collectivism 6.56 (0.86) 6.72 (0.98) 6.28 (0.87) 
CRPR 
Authoritarian 67.71 (8.76) 80.75 (10.21) 84.34 (9.83) 
Authoritative 118.33 (8.29) 114.41 (10.30) 58.65 (9.93) 
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2.2.5 Authoritarian and authoritative parenting attitudes 
Missing data precluded measures of authoritative parenting attitudes from three parents 
(one Caucasian Canadian parent and two Korean parents living in Korea), and measures 
of authoritarian parenting for one parent (one Korean parent living in Korea). In all cases, 
parents omitted answers to some questions within each subscale. The reliability statistics 
(Cronbach’s α) for the two subscales of the CRPR are .973 (the authoritative subscale) 
and .738 (the authoritarian subscale), respectively, indicating high internal consistencies 
for the both subscales.  
Group means and standard deviations of two subscales of the CRPR are presented in 
Table 2 and Figure 3. There were group differences on both subscales (for the 
Authoritarian subscale, F (2, 95) = 27.64, p < .001, ηp
2= .368; for the Authoritative 
subscale, F (2, 93) = 386.47, p < .001, ηp
2= .893). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc 
comparisons confirmed that Korean parents, both those living in Canada and those living 
in Korea, had higher scores on the Authoritarian subscale than Canadian parents (both p’ 
s < .001), but did not differ from each other (p = .413). As well, Korean parents living 
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Figure 2. Mean scores in each subscale of the Individualism-Collectivism 
Scale (INDCOL; HI: Horizontal Individualism, VI: Vertical Individualism, 
HC: Horizontal Collectivism, and VC: Vertical Collectivism). Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Korea had lower scores on the Authoritative subscale than Korean parents living in 
Canada and Canadian parents (both p’ s < .001), who did not differ from each other (p = 
.301). 
 
Figure 3. Mean scores in each subscale of the Child-Rearing Practices Report (CRPR). 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
2.2.6 Mediation analyses 
As a final analysis, we tested whether parental cultural value orientation or child-rearing 
attitudes mediated the association between country-of-origin and children inhibitory 
control using a macro developed for SPSS with Model 4 (PROCESS; Hayes, 2013). 
Neither parenting variable mediated this association (see Figure 4 and 5). 
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Figure 4. Path diagram of mediation analyses examining four subscales of the 
Individualism-Collectivism Scale (HI: Horizontal Individualism, VI: Vertical 
Individualism, HC: Horizontal Collectivism, VC: Vertical Collectivism) and two 
parenting attitudes (Authoritative and Authoritarian parenting attitudes) as possible 
mediators of group differences (English monolinguals vs. Korea-English bilinguals) in 
Inhibitory Control (Interference effect: accuracy on congruent trials minus accuracy on 
incongruent trials). The figures are coefficients from regression analyses. The analyses 
indicated that there was no significant mediator of the Group-Inhibitory Control 
relationship. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p<.001. 
 
27 
 
 
Figure 5. Path diagram of mediation analyses examining four subscales of the 
Individualism-Collectivism Scale (HI: Horizontal Individualism, VI: Vertical 
Individualism, HC: Horizontal Collectivism, VC: Vertical Collectivism) and two 
parenting attitudes (Authoritative and Authoritarian parenting attitudes) as possible 
mediators of group differences (English monolinguals vs. Korean monolinguals) in 
Inhibitory Control (Interference effect: accuracy on congruent trials minus accuracy on 
incongruent trials). The figures are coefficients from regression analyses. The analyses 
indicated that there was no significant mediator of the Group-Inhibitory Control 
relationship. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p<.001. 
2.3 Discussion 
The current study compared the performance of bilingual and monolingual 
kindergarteners of varied national original on an age-appropriate response inhibition task. 
There were several important results.  
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First, we replicated evidence that bilingual children of East Asian origin (in the present 
study, children from South Korea) make fewer errors in response inhibition tasks than do 
monolingual children of North American origin (Bialystok, 1999). This finding may 
reflect an effect of language status, such that bilingual children are less prone to 
distraction than monolingual children (Bialystok, 1999). However, a second and equally 
plausible interpretation is that this finding reflects differences in children’s and their 
family’s country-of-origin, given that children from East Asia are less prone to 
distraction in inhibitory control tasks than are children from North America (Oh & Lewis, 
2008; Sabbagh et al., 2006).  
We tested this possibility and found that Korean monolingual children performed 
comparably to Korean-English bilingual children but more accurately than Caucasian 
Canadian monolingual children. Importantly, group differences in the present study were 
not attributable to differences in performance across all trial types, as all three groups 
performed comparably on congruent trials. Differences were only evident on incongruent 
trials that required maintenance of a response rule and inhibition of a prepotent response. 
Nor were group differences in inhibitory control attributable to differences in age. 
Although Korean monolingual children were slightly younger than Korean-English 
bilingual children, statistically controlling these differences had no impact on the results. 
Taken together then, the findings suggest that previously reported differences between 
East Asian bilingual and Canadian monolingual children (Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok & 
Martin, 2004) relate to differences in children’s country-of-origin rather than their 
language status.  
Finally, we explored whether country-of-origin differences in children’s inhibitory 
control could be explained by differences in either parental cultural values (i.e., 
collectivist versus individualist; Hofstede, 1984; Lewis et al., 2009) or attitudes (i.e., 
authoritarian versus authoritative; Chen et al., 1998; Chen, Dong, & Zhou, 1997; Vinden, 
2001). Korean and Korean-Canadian parents were generally more authoritarian and less 
authoritative than Canadian parents, but not more collectivist and less individualist 
(Clarke-Stewart et al., 2006; Hofstede, 1980). Importantly, neither parenting variable 
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explained country-of-origin differences in children’s inhibitory control. Of course, these 
findings could simply reflect idiosyncrasies of our sample, the nature of our measures, or 
the fact that individuals from East Asia are not always more collectivist and less 
individualist than individuals from North America (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 
2002). However, they are certainly at odds with the common assumption that country-of-
origin differences in children’s inhibitory control can be easily explained by differences 
in parental collectivist/individualist cultural values (Yang et al., 2011). These issues 
deserve further research attention.   
The critical overarching implication of the present findings though is that previously 
reported differences between East Asian bilingual children and Canadian monolingual 
children’s inhibitory control (e.g., Bialystok, 1999) were likely not related to differences 
in children’s language status, but to differences in children’s and their parents’ country-
of-origin. Between-group comparisons are difficult to interpret because they often 
encompass variables beyond those of immediate interest (Morton & Harper, 2007). The 
current findings suggest that measuring and controlling such variables significantly 
attenuates the bilingual advantage in children’s inhibitory control. 
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Chapter 3  
3 The effects of individual differences in language status 
and country of origin on Theory of Mind 
Theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to understand other people’s mental states, is crucial 
for social adaptation, and shows robust development in preschool-aged children 
(Wellman et al., 2001). Indeed, during this period, individual differences in ToM become 
increasingly pronounced as the result of a variety of social factors, such as opportunities 
for social interaction (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Hughes & Dunn, 1998), the presence of 
siblings (McAlister & Peterson, 2007), and culture (Vinden, 1996).  
Several lines of evidence suggest that ToM is related to EF. First, there is evidence 
suggesting that the developmental timetable of ToM parallels that of EF. Children 
typically start succeeding on standard false-belief tasks in the preschool period when EF 
skills are also rapidly developing (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Zelazo et al., 2003). Second, 
performance in ToM and EF tasks are frequently correlated, even when age, gender, and 
verbal ability are controlled (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995). In addition, 
evidence suggests that advances in EF lead to advances on ToM and vice versa. For 
example, early EF predicts later ToM (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Hughes & 
Ensor, 2007) and early ToM predicts later EF (McAlister & Peterson, 2013). The close 
relation between ToM and EF can also be found in brain studies. There are common brain 
regions such as the prefrontal cortex, that activate in association with both ToM and EF 
tasks (Channon & Crawford, 2000; Frith & Frith, 1999; Funahashi & Andreau, 2013; 
Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007). These findings suggest that ToM and EF might be 
based on a common process.  
On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that ToM and EF are distinct processes. 
For example, children with autism show deficits in false-belief tasks but intact 
performance in tasks that have similar EF loads but do not involve mental state 
reasoning, suggesting that ToM and EF can be dissociated (Charman & Baron‐Cohen, 
1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Several neuroimaging studies (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; 
Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005) also lend support to the idea that 
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ToM and EF are distinct processes. For example, the right temporo-parietal junction 
(rTPJ) shows increased activity to stories that involve reasoning about others’ mental 
states, but not to stories that involve reasoning about nonsocial events or physical aspects 
of a person (social but non-ToM related stories). These findings suggest that the rTPJ is a 
ToM-specific brain region.  
Thus, it is unclear whether ToM and EF are two facets of the same underlying process or 
are distinct processes. As part of examining this question, Experiment 2 tested whether 
the effects of country-of-origin (culture) on EF reported in Experiment 1 extend to ToM. 
To that end, the identical samples reported in Experiment 1 (the Korean-English (K-E) 
bilingual, English monolingual, and Korean monolingual kindergarteners) were 
administered two ToM measurements: (1) the “unexpected-contents” false-belief task 
where children are shown a container with unexpected content, such as a chocolate box 
containing a toy car, and are asked what someone who had never opened the box before 
would think was inside; and (2) a modified version of the standard “change-in-location” 
false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) called the sandbox task. In this task, children 
are introduced to two characters who know the location of an object. One character then 
leaves and during the first character’s absence, the second character moves the object to 
another location. When the first character comes back, children are asked to indicate 
where the first character will look for the object. If children understand that the first 
character holds a false-belief about the location of the object, they will indicate the 
original hiding location even though this departs from their own knowledge and reality. 
The advantage with the sandbox task however is that children’s false-belief bias can be 
continuously measured by calculating the distance between the original hiding location 
and location of the dot they draw. 
The predictions were as follows. If ToM and EF are simply two facets of a domain-
general process, then the effects of country-of-origin (culture) on EF reported in 
Experiment 1 should be observed in ToM. In Experiment 1 (Chapter 3), K-E bilingual 
and Korean monolingual children outperformed English monolingual children in the 
Stroop task, suggesting evidence of cultural effect on EF. Thus, if ToM and EF are based 
on a common process, K-E bilingual and Korean monolingual children should also 
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outperform English monolingual children in ToM tasks. However, if ToM and EF are 
different processes, then the pattern of results for EF (observed in Experiment 1) relating 
to language status and country-of-origin and the pattern of results for ToM should be 
different. To be specific, children of all three groups are predicted to show comparable 
performance on ToM tasks based on the evidence showing universal development of 
ToM, irrespective of ToM task types and countries (Avis & Harris, 1991; Lee, Olson, & 
Torrance, 1999; Sabbagh et al., 2006; Wellman et al., 2001).  
Since a null finding is predicted, and conventional Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
(NHST) is unable to test null effects, the current study conducted not only NHST but also 
Bayesian analyses to see which hypothesis (null vs. alternative) can be supported by the 
data. 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
The participants were identical to those in the Chapter 2.  
3.1.2 Tasks and measures 
3.1.2.1 Language status 
The language status measures were identical to those in the Chapter 2 (see Appendix B). 
3.1.2.2 Socio-economic status 
The socio-economic status measures were identical to those in the Chapter 2 (see 
Appendix B). 
3.1.2.3 Theory of Mind 
Theory of mind ability was measured using two tasks: (1) the “unexpected-contents” 
false-belief task and (2) Sandbox task. 
First, in the “unexpected-contents” false-belief task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Sabbagh 
et al., 2006) children were shown a chocolate candy box and asked to report what they 
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thought was inside. After responding, children watched as the box was opened to reveal a 
crayon (i.e., unexpected contents). Children were then asked: (1) what they had thought 
was inside when they first saw the box before they opened it; (2) what someone else who 
had not looked inside the box before would think was inside; and (3) what was actually 
inside the box. Since the first two questions were related to the ability to infer their own 
belief and another person’s belief, children’s answers to these two questions were scored 
to provide a total task score between 0 and 2. In addition to the false-belief task, children 
were also administered a control task that paralleled the false-belief task but did not 
involve mental state inference. In the control task, children were asked to open a box 
containing a toy pig, get the toy pig out of the box, and then put a toy horse inside 
instead. After doing so, the box was closed, and children were asked: (1) what was inside 
the box now; and (2) what had been inside the box before they opened it. 
Second, the sandbox task (Mahy, Bernstein, Gerrard, & Atance, 2017) is a variant of the 
standard “change-in-location” false-belief task that continuously measures children’s 
false-belief understanding. In the current study, a paper and pencil version of the sandbox 
task was used. In this task, a protagonist hid an object in Location 1 (L1; marked with an 
X). The object was then moved 121mm away to Location 2 (L2; marked with a second 
X) during the protagonist’s absence. The task consisted of two different stories. In one 
story (false-belief condition), children were asked to mark a dot to indicate where the 
protagonist thought the object was. In the other story (memory-control condition), 
children were asked to mark a dot to indicate where the protagonist had hidden the object. 
Since the correct response to both conditions is L1, children’s scores were calculated as 
the distance between L1 and the dot they marked. Greater accuracy on both stories was, 
therefore, represented by scores closer to zero, while false-belief or memory biases were 
reflected by larger, positive scores. Importantly, the two stories differed in terms of their 
processing demands. The false-belief condition required not only the ability to remember 
the original location of the object but also the ability to consider the protagonist’s false-
belief of the location of the object (ToM ability). In contrast, the memory-control 
condition required only memory of the original location of the object. The dependent 
variable for this task, false-belief bias, was calculated by subtracting the memory-control 
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condition score from the false-belief condition score. As such, it allowed detection of 
small intra-individual differences in ToM ability. 
3.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that in Chapter 2.  
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Language status 
Descriptive statistics for PPVT scores and daily language use are provided in Table 1 in 
Chapter 2. 
3.2.2 Socio-economic status 
Socio-economic background is reported in Table 1 in the Chapter 2. 
3.2.3 Theory of Mind 
3.2.3.1 Unexpected-contents false-belief task 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group on children’s 
performance in the unexpected-contents false-belief task (Table 3 and Figure 6). There 
was no effect of group, F (2, 96) = 2.438, p = .093, even after controlling for age, F (2, 
95) = 2.634, p = .077.  Further, the Bayes Factor (with a default Cauchy prior width of 
0.707, JASP Team, 2018) suggested inconclusive evidence on which hypothesis of group 
(null or the alternative one) was favoured by the data, BF01 = 1.536. However, when 
considering both group and age variables using Bayesian ANCOVA, the Bayes Factor 
indicated positive and moderate evidence for the null hypothesis, BF01 = 4.746, relative to 
the alternative hypothesis. 
Table 3. Participants’ means (and standard deviations) of scores for two theory of mind 
tasks, respectively. Range for scores on false-belief contents task is 0-2, and scores on 
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sandbox task are calculated by subtracting the memory-control condition score from the 
false-belief condition score (in millimeter) 
 
English 
monolingual 
Korean-English 
bilingual 
Korean 
monolingual 
False-belief contents task   0.94 (0.69) 0.59 (0.71) 0.64 (0.70) 
Sandbox task (False-
belief bias) 
47.82 (90.06) 21.25 (76.44) 17.24 (61.12) 
 
Figure 6. Mean scores in the false-belief contents task. Error bars represent standard 
errors.  
The three groups also performed comparably in the control condition: English 
monolingual group = 1.68 (0.54), K-E bilingual group = 1.78 (0.49), and Korean 
monolingual group = 1.70 (0.64). A one-way ANOVA comparing the effect of group on 
performance revealed no effect of group, F (2, 96) = 0.323, p = .725, even after 
controlling for age, F (2, 95) = 0.085, p = .918. Further, the Bayes Factor (with a default 
Cauchy prior width of 0.707, JASP Team, 2018) suggested positive and moderate 
evidence for null hypothesis of group effect, BF01 = 8.352. Even when considering both 
group and age variables using Bayesian ANCOVA, the Bayes Factor indicated positive 
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and moderate evidence for null hypothesis, BF01 = 3.042, relative to the alternative 
hypothesis. Thus, the Bayesian analysis suggested that there was a null effect of group. 
3.2.3.2 Sandbox task 
Missing data precluded one English monolingual child’s false-belief bias score due to 
experimenter error. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was no group difference in 
children’s false-belief bias on the Sandbox task (the scores of the false-belief condition 
minus the scores of the memory-control condition; see Table 3 and Figure 7), F (2, 95) = 
1.540, p = .220, even after controlling for age, F (2, 94) = 1.709, p = .187.  Further, the 
Bayes Factor (with a default Cauchy prior width of 0.707, JASP Team, 2018) suggested 
positive and moderate evidence for null hypothesis regarding the group effect, BF01 = 
3.127, relative to the alternative hypothesis of a group effect. Also, when considering 
both group and age variables using Bayesian ANCOVA, the Bayes Factor indicated 
positive and moderate evidence for the null hypothesis, BF01 = 6.013, relative to the 
alternative hypothesis. Again, the Bayesian analysis suggested a null effect of group. 
 
Figure 7. Mean scores in the sandbox task. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 investigated whether ToM and EF are based on a common process or they 
are distinct by examining if the socio-cultural factors that influence EF extend to ToM. 
To that end, bilingual and monolingual Canadian and Korean kindergarteners were 
administered ToM tasks, and their performance on the tasks was compared. There were 
several important results.  
First, when three groups with comparable socio-economic backgrounds (K-E bilingual, 
English monolingual, and Korean monolingual preschool-aged children) were compared, 
there was no difference among the three groups in two widely used false-belief ToM 
tasks (i.e., the “unexpected-contents” and “change-in-location” false-belief tasks). 
Despite attempts to detect subtle differences between the groups using a continuous 
measurement of “change-in-location” false-belief task (i.e., the sandbox task), there was 
no difference in children’s ToM performance, implying no evidence of either a bilingual 
advantage or a cultural difference in ToM.   
Lack of group difference in ToM task performance contrasts with the results on EF 
reported in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, both K-E bilingual and Korean monolingual 
children outperformed English monolingual counterparts in the age-appropriate Stroop 
task, suggesting that country-of-origin (culture) has effect on EF. However, in the current 
study, all the children showed comparable performance in the ToM tasks regardless of 
their language status and country-of-origin, implying that neither language status nor 
country-of-origin (culture) have a comparable effect on ToM. These findings are 
consistent with the idea that ToM and EF are distinct processes because the effect of 
country-of-origin on EF reported in the previous chapter did not extend to ToM. 
In a view of one of the critical shortcomings in the previous literature on the relation 
between ToM and EF in early childhood, namely, the possibility of independent co-
development of the two abilities, the current study has important implication. In the 
previous literature (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995), a significantly strong 
correlation between children’s performance on ToM tasks and EF tasks was found even 
after controlling for other extraneous variables (e.g., age, gender, verbal ability), and the 
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significant correlation was interpreted as evidence showing that these two abilities are 
strongly associated with each other. Given that both ToM and EF rapidly develop in the 
same period (i.e., preschool period, Carlson & Moses, 2001; Zelazo et al., 2003), it is 
possible that the significant correlation simply comes from the independent (but 
coincident) co-development of the two abilities. The current study has important features 
in that it proposed a new approach, examining whether the pattern of results for one 
ability (e.g., EF) due to individual difference in socio-cultural factors is similar to that for 
the other ability (e.g., ToM), to investigate the relationship between the two abilities 
while being free from the shortcoming that the previous literature might have.  
In contrast with the previous findings on bilingual advantage in ToM (Berguno & 
Bowler, 2004; Goetz, 2003; Kovács, 2009), K-E bilingual children in the current study 
did not show any advantage in ToM compared to English or Korean monolingual 
children. Regarding the discrepancy, one critical difference between the previous 
literature and the current study is whether or not extraneous variables possibly related to 
bilingual advantage (i.e., SES and country-of-origin) are controlled for. Though some 
previous studies attempted to control for these extraneous variables (Goetz, 2003; 
Nguyen & Astington, 2014), many other studies did not (Berguno & Bowler, 2004; 
Farhadian et al., 2010; Gordon, 2016; Kovács, 2009; Kyuchukov & de Villiers, 2009). 
Thus, it is possible that bilingual advantage in ToM reported in the previous literature 
comes in part from differences in other extraneous variables that have been relating to 
ToM, such as SES (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Pears & Moses, 2003) and country-of-
origin/culture (Ahn & Miller, 2012; Liu et al., 2008; Naito & Seki, 2009; Wang, Devine, 
Wong, & Hughes, 2016). The importance of controlling for other relevant variables can 
also be found in the bilingual advantage in cognitive control. For example, there have 
been prevailing results showing that bilingual children are advantaged in a variety of 
cognitive control tasks, including response inhibition tasks (Bialystok & Martin, 2004; 
Carlson & Meltzoff, 2008; Martin-Rhee & Bialystok, 2008) and working memory tasks 
(Blom, Küntay, Messer, Verhagen, & Leseman, 2014; Morales, Calvo, & Bialystok, 
2013), compared to monolingual children. However, when attempting to properly control 
possible differences in extraneous variables relating to bilingual advantage (i.e., ethnicity, 
SES), the bilingual advantage in cognitive control disappeared (Duñabeitia et al., 2014; 
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Morton & Harper, 2007). Likewise, no evidence for the bilingual advantage in ToM in 
the current study might be due to the attempt to measure and control extraneous variables 
relating to bilingual-monolingual group comparison. 
Lastly, the lack of difference among the three groups in the current study seems to 
correspond with existing literature showing universal development of ToM. For example, 
when comparing children from Western culture and from non-Western countries (i.e., 
China, Cameroon), their performance on a variety of ToM tasks was not different, 
showing no cross-cultural difference in ToM development (Avis & Harris, 1991; Lee et 
al., 1999; Sabbagh et al., 2006). In addition, preschool-aged children show their 
consistent and robust development of false-belief understanding, irrespective of task 
types and countries of origin (Wellman et al., 2001). The lack of difference in 
performance on ToM tasks between Canadian and Korean children in the current finding 
can be seen as evidence adding weight to the universal development of ToM.     
The critical implication of the present findings is that the current study is consistent with 
previous findings suggesting that ToM and EF seem to be distinct processes (Charman & 
Baron‐Cohen, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Lough, Gregory, & Hodges, 2001; van der 
Meer, Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2011). When seeking whether socio-
cultural factors influencing EF (i.e., language status and country-of-origin) have 
comparable effects on ToM, the current findings suggest that the previously reported 
close relationship between ToM and EF (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995) 
seems to be overestimated due to similar developmental timetables between the two 
abilities.  
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Chapter 4  
4 The relationship between Theory of Mind and Executive 
Function: Results from experiments 1 and 2 
Experiment 1 examined whether socio-cultural factors (i.e., language status and country-
of-origin) are associated with differences in preschool-aged children’s EF. To that end, 
bilingual and monolingual preschool-aged children of varied national origin were 
compared on an age-appropriate inhibitory control task. The results showed that Korean 
children, regardless of their language status, made fewer errors in the task compared to 
Caucasian English monolingual children from Canada, indicating that country-of-origin, 
not language status, is related to differences in young children’s EF.  
Experiment 2 compared the performance of the children studied in Experiment 1 on two 
widely used false-belief understanding tasks. The results showed that there was no group 
difference in ToM task performance.  
In order to see whether the effects of groups on ToM and EF performance, respectively, 
are different, one-way MANOVA was conducted with groups as independent variables (3 
levels: English monolinguals, Korean monolinguals, and Korean-English bilinguals 
groups) and with interference effect in the Stroop task (calculated by subtracting accuracy 
on the incongruent trials from accuracy on the congruent trials and then transformed into 
Z scores) and false-belief bias in the Sandbox task (calculated by subtracting the 
memory-control condition score from the false-belief condition score and then 
transformed into Z scores) as dependent variables. There was a statistically significant 
difference in ToM and EF performance based on groups, F (4, 188) = 2.645, p = .035, 
Wilk's Λ = 0.896, partial η2 = .053, and which remained significant even when 
controlling for group difference in age, F (4, 186) = 2.735, p = .030, Wilk's Λ = 0.892, 
partial η2 = .056. To be specific, groups have a statistically significant effect on the 
interference effect in the Stroop task, F (2, 95) = 4.267, p = .017, partial η2 = .082, but 
not on the false-belief bias in the Sandbox task, F (2, 95) = 1.540, p = .220. Tukey HSD 
post-hoc revealed that K-E bilinguals and Korean monolinguals significantly 
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outperformed English monolinguals on a Stroop task (ps = .054 and .024, respectively) 
but they were indistinguishable (p = .950).  
The results indicate that the effects of groups on EF demonstrated in Experiment 1 are 
different from the effects of groups on ToM shown in Experiment 2. Thus, it suggest that 
a group factor did not show analogous patterns of differences in ToM and EF, and which 
adds weight to the possibility that ToM and EF are distinct processes.   
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Chapter 5 3 
5 Introduction 
The ability to imagine what other people are thinking, including thoughts that differ from 
one’s own, is known as theory of mind (ToM). Converging evidence suggests ToM 
ability declines with age (Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & Taylor, 2002). However, given 
that ToM ability depends on at least ToM-specific processes (including inferring mental 
states from observed behavior; binding agent representations, propositional attitudes, and 
propositional content; and decoupling mental state representations from primary 
representations, among other processes) and executive function (EF), it is unclear what 
leads to the age-related deterioration of ToM ability. Does it come from the decline of 
ToM-specific competence, EF, or both? Here we explore the underlying causes of age-
related decline in ToM ability. 
EF is associated with the development of ToM across the lifespan. For example, aspects 
of EF including inhibitory control and working memory have been shown to be 
correlated with false-belief reasoning in early development (Carlson & Moses, 2001). It 
is also well established that EF deteriorates with age (Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 
2003), and although this alone does not establish that it is responsible for changes in ToM 
among the elderly, it has been also found that the age-related decline of ToM is related to 
the deterioration of EF (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 
2006; Phillips et al., 2011; Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 2012). For example, EF is 
significantly correlated with performance on ToM tasks (German & Hehman, 2006) and 
even statistically mediates age-related decline of ToM (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton 
et al., 2009; Phillips et al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012). While suggestive, these results 
are unable to establish whether older adults’ difficulty in ToM is caused by reduced EF or 
by decline in ToM competence.  
 
3
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ToM ability in the elderly has been primarily assessed with elicited-response (or explicit) 
tasks (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et 
al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012). In a common variant, participants observe an object 
moved in the presence or absence of an agent and then are prompted to provide a verbal 
response indicating where the agent thinks the object is located. Task analyses suggest 
these conditions impose high EF load (e.g., inhibiting a prepotent response, Baillargeon, 
Scott, & He, 2011).  
One previous meta-analysis (Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013) reviewed 
existing studies on aging and ToM to see whether there is age-related decline of ToM in a 
variety of ToM tasks by categorizing tasks according to domain (i.e., cognitive, affective, 
or mixed ToM) and modality of presentation (i.e., dynamic-visual, static-visual, or 
verbal). The results showed that older adults performed more poorly than younger adults 
across all types of ToM tasks, and it was concluded that ToM decline with age is due to 
the elderly’s real deterioration of ToM competence, not due to performance factors. 
However, the meta-analysis does not answer whether changes in underlying ToM 
competence, EF, or both cause age-related decline of ToM. Critically, since the tasks 
entered into the meta-analysis were elicited-response ToM tasks, which impose high 
executive demands, it leaves the possibility open that the high performance demands of 
those tasks masked an intact, underlying mindreading capacity in the elderly.  
In contrast to the elicited-response tasks, spontaneous-response (or implicit) tasks reduce 
response-selection and response-inhibition (Scott, 2017). For example, spontaneous-
response tasks (e.g., looking behavior, spontaneous helping behavior) do not require 
participants to explicitly generate their responses, needing less non-ToM processing 
compared to the elicited-response ToM tasks. During the tasks, participants’ spontaneous 
response (e.g., looking behavior) is measured. In the current study, we use a spontaneous-
response ToM task to explore whether the elderly show improved ToM ability when 
performance demands are reduced. 
An EF-decline account, in which decline in underlying EF is responsible for reduced 
ToM ability in the elderly, produces two logically connected predictions. First, 
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individuals with compromised EF, such as the elderly, should have difficulty on ToM 
tasks that put high demands on EF. The first prediction is supported by many previous 
studies (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips 
et al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012). These studies all relied on explicit elicited-response 
tasks which impose high performance demands, including EF load. These increased 
demands appear to overwhelm the limited EF in the elderly, producing age-related 
deterioration in ToM ability. Second, individuals with compromised EF should show 
improved performance on ToM tasks that reduce load on EF. While these low demand 
tasks have been used extensively with infants and children (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007), they have not to be 
widely used with older adults. The current investigation tests the second prediction. If the 
EF-decline account is correct, it is predicted that the elderly in the current study would 
show comparable performance to younger adults on a spontaneous-response task which 
involves low EF demand.  
In contrast, a competence-decline account, in which decline in ToM competence is 
responsible for reduced ToM ability in the elderly, predicts worse performance on ToM 
tasks in the elderly compared to younger adults for both elicited-response and 
spontaneous-response tasks. Reduced demands should be of no benefit if the elderly lack 
the concepts and mechanisms to represent and compute mental states.  
This sets up a critical test: If ToM competence in the elderly is intact as the EF-decline 
account claims, then reducing EF demands should improve ToM performance, but if 
ToM competence is not intact as the competence-decline account claims, then reducing 
EF demands should not improve ToM performance. To adjudicate between the accounts, 
we explored what happens in a low-demand task.  
A recent study found that both older and younger adults performed similarly on a 
spontaneous-response ToM task, consistent with the EF-decline account that older adults 
have preserved false-belief tracking (Grainger, Henry, Naughtin, Comino, & Dux, 2018). 
The current study differed in three critical respects: 1) the research was preregistered, 
supporting valid null hypothesis significance testing by controlling long-run error rates, 
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2) Bayesian analysis was used to quantify evidence for a null hypothesis of no difference 
in belief tracking between older and younger adults relative to an alternative hypothesis 
that there was a difference, and 3) EF differences between older and younger adults were 
measured, not inferred. A brief introduction is suggested here. 
5.1 Materials and methods 
We preregistered hypotheses described above, an a priori power analysis, and data 
analysis plans. Preregistration, stimuli, and data analyses are available on the Open 
Science Framework: 
[https://osf.io/y7xrq/?view_only=e0fe507f7d9d4420a98b2152d91c2481]. Raw data were 
not institutionally approved to be shared on a repository but are available upon request. 
5.1.1 Participants 
Sixty-seven younger adults and 68 older adults participated in the study. Thirty-seven 
younger adults were recruited through a university research participation pool and 
received course credit for their participation, and the rest were recruited via poster on 
campus and were paid for their participation4. The older adults were recruited from the 
local community and were paid for their participation. Prior to collecting data, we 
conducted an a priori power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). Based on an a priori power analysis with 80% power, a medium effect 
size, and an alpha value of .05, we needed 98 participants (49 participants per each age 
group).  
Out of 135 participants, 37 (18 younger and 19 older adults) were excluded for further 
analysis due to failure to look at both object and empty locations in at least one condition 
(n = 12, 4 younger and 8 older adults), having a current diagnosis or history of major 
psychiatric and neurological illnesses (n = 13, 5 younger and 9 older adults), self-
reporting as English as a second language (3 younger adults), failing to complete several 
 
4
 This study was approved by Human Research Ethics board at Western University (see Appendix F). 
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measures (1 younger adult), or demonstrating signs of depression (n = 7, 5 younger and 2 
older adults) measured on the short Geriatric Depression Scale (sGDS; Sheikh & 
Yesavage, 1986). For two younger adults, data was obtained from only the first half of 
the ToM task (see Procedure section), but their data was included as it met our pre-
registered inclusion criteria. As a result, the final sample consisted of 49 (34 females) 
healthy younger adults (M = 20.37, SD = 3.25, 25 from the Participation Pool) and 49 (37 
females) healthy older adults between 60 to 87 years of age (M = 69.37, SD = 7.58). 
Older adults reported more years of education than the younger adults (older: M = 16.03, 
SD = 3.24; younger: M = 14.08, SD = 2.48, t(96) = 3.34, p = .001). Also, older adults 
showed higher scores in verbal subtest of Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Wechsler, 2011) compared to the younger adults (older: M = 41.69, SD = 7.65; 
younger: M = 37.47, SD = 6.48, t(96) = 2.95, p = .004). The two age groups were not 
significantly different in the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, 
& McHugh, 1975), t(59.815) = 1.886, p = .064. Regarding sGDS, older adults showed 
lower scores than the younger adults (older: M = 0.59, SD = 0.96; younger: M = 1.96, SD 
= 1.56, t(77.730) = 5.20, p < .001). 
5.1.2 Tasks and materials 
5.1.2.1 General cognitive assessment tasks 
To ensure that all participants had normal mental functioning, participants were asked to 
complete a simple questionnaire to obtain their demographic data, the MMSE for 
screening dementia, verbal subtest of the WASI for obtaining an estimate of their 
crystalized IQ, and the sGDS for screening any symptoms of depression. 
5.1.2.2 Theory of Mind (ToM) eye tracking task 
Forty animations (20 true-belief and 20 false-belief trials) varying in child identity, 
animal identity, initial animal location, and room identity, were used. For half of the 40 
animations, a child stood behind the box where s/he believed the animal was located at 
the end of a trial, whereas for the other half of the animations, the child stood behind the 
box where s/he did not believe the animal was located. Therefore, where the child stood 
was unrelated to his/her belief about the location of the animal.  
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There were four phases in each trial: Animation phase, Anticipation phase, Fixation 
phase, and Response phase. During the animation phase (11 seconds), a child 
(protagonist) put an animal in one of two boxes and left the room. At this time, on false-
belief trials, the animal moved out of the box and into the other box during the child’s 
absence, whereas, on true-belief trials, the child returned the room first and then the 
animal moved out of the box and into the other box. When the child returned to the room 
on both types of trials, s/he walked forward, toward the boxes, but stayed in the middle. 
During the anticipation phase (4 seconds), the child stood still in the middle. During the 
fixation phase (1 second), a white fixation cross appeared on a grey screen. Lastly, during 
the response phase, the child stood behind one of the two boxes. At this time, participants 
were asked to press one of the buttons (left arrow key or right arrow key) to indicate 
whether the child stood behind either the left or right box. 
To measure participants’ eye movements, a corneal reflection eye tracker (Tobii x120, 
Tobii Technology, Stockholm, Sweden) was used with E-prime software (version 
2.0.8.90; Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA) and E-prime Extensions 
for Tobii (version 2.0.1.26). Specifically, the amount of time participants looked at each 
of the two boxes during a five-second-analysis window (including the anticipation phase 
and the fixation phase), from after the child returned to the room to before she/he was 
about to approach one of the boxes, was measured and used to compute a preferential 
looking score ranging from 0 (looking only to the animal box) to 1 (looking only to the 
empty box). Since the child believed the animal was in the empty box on false-belief 
trials and in the animal box on true belief trials, if participants spontaneously track those 
beliefs and make anticipatory eye movements to the location where they expect the child 
to search given those same beliefs, they should look more to the empty box on false-
belief trials, than on true-belief trials. 
5.1.2.3 Executive function (EF) tasks 
Since executive function (EF) refers to a set of multiple cognitive processes for goal-
directed behavior (Baddeley, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000), using a variety of EF tasks is 
crucial to measure EF. One of the widely used models proposes that EF consists of three 
subcomponents including inhibition, updating, and shifting (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; 
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Miyake et al., 2000). Based on this model, we measured each of the three subcomponents 
of EF with two or more standard tasks in case one task did not fully measure a specific 
subcomponent. For inhibition, we used Stroop and Go/No-go tasks; for updating, we used 
forward and backward digit span tasks; for shifting, we used Digit Symbol Substitution 
Test (DSST, Patel & Kurdi, 2015), Trail Making Test (TMT, Reitan, 1958), and 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST, Piper et al., 2012). In the Stroop task, participants 
were asked to respond to color of a word, not to the name of the word, as quickly and 
accurately as possible. There were 180 trials (60 congruent trials, 60 incongruent trials, 
and 60 neutral trials). The reaction time and accuracy for each trial were recorded. In the 
Go/No-go task, participants were asked to press the Enter key when the Go condition was 
met (i.e., whenever the letter ‘W’ appears on a monitor) and not to press anything when 
the Go condition was not met (No-Go condition). There were 300 trials in total, and 45 
trials out of them were the No-Go condition. Accuracy was recorded, and the false-alarm 
rate was analyzed. In the DSST, participants were asked to attend to the symbol 
associated with each of nine different digits and then to draw the corresponding symbols 
under each digit as quickly as possible in 90 seconds. The number of correct answers was 
recorded. Also, in the Digit Span tasks (forward and backward) measuring working 
memory, participants heard a series of numbers and they were asked to recall the 
numbers in sequence (or in reverse of the presented order). There were three trials in each 
section (e.g., in section 2, two numbers were presented, and three numbers were 
presented in section 3). If they correctly recalled one of the three trials within the same 
section, the task went on. If they gave wrong numbers on all the trials within the same 
section, the task was stopped. The number of correct answers was analyzed. In the TMT, 
there were two parts to the test: in Part A, participants were required to connect letters in 
alphabetical order as quickly as possible and in Part B, they had to connect letters and 
numbers alternatingly in alphabetical (letters) and ascending (numbers) order, 
respectively (e.g., A1B2C3). Since Part B has been considered an EF measurement, the 
total time to complete Part B was measured. Lastly, for the WCST, the Psychology 
Experiment Building Language tests (PEBL)’s version of the WSCT (Piper et al., 2012) 
was used. Accuracy was analyzed. 
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5.1.3 Procedure 
The study proceeded in the following order: General cognitive assessment tasks, 
calibration phase for the eye tracking task, ToM eye tracking task (the first session; 20 
trials), half of the EF tasks, 10-minute break, ToM eye tracking task (the second session; 
20 trials), a questionnaire to ensure whether they understood the eye tracking task’s 
instructions, and the remaining half of the EF tasks. Half of the participants were given 
the Stroop task, Trial making task, and Digit span task as the first half of the EF tasks, 
whereas the other half of the participants were given Go/No-go task, Digit symbol 
substitution task, and Wisconsin card sorting task as the first half of the EF tasks. 
5.2 Results 
For the ToM eye tracking task, the ratio of the participants’ looking time to the empty 
box on the false-belief trials (or the true-belief trials) to the total looking time to both the 
empty and object box on the false-belief trials (or the true-belief trials) was calculated, 
producing a looking preference score to the empty box for both conditions (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Preferential looking ratios, with a score of 0 meaning looking only to the 
animal box, a score of 1 meaning looking only to the empty box. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
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5.2.1 Age differences in spontaneous belief-reasoning 
As a confirmatory analysis, age effects on preferential looking ratio to the empty box 
were investigated using a 2 (age group: younger vs. older adults) X 2 (belief type: true-
belief vs. false-belief) mixed design ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of 
belief type, F(1, 96) = 63.61, p < .001, ηp
2= .399, showing that looking preference to the 
empty box was larger in false-belief trials (M = 0.35, SD = 0.29) than in true-belief trials 
(M = 0.10, SD = 0.14). This indicates that participants processed the child’s belief about 
the location of the animal. No main effect of age group, F(1, 96) = 0.47, p = .493, and no 
interaction effect between age group and belief type, F(1, 96) = 0.28, p = .598, were 
found. Further, the Bayes Factor (with a default Cauchy prior width of 0.707, JASP, 
2018) suggested positive evidence for null hypotheses about the age effect, BF01=4.999, 
and the interaction effect, BF01=3.95 relative to the alternative hypotheses of age effect 
and interaction effect, respectively. 
5.2.2 Age differences in the EF tasks 
As a confirmatory analysis, descriptive information on each age group’s performance on 
each EF task (raw scores) and the statistical differences for each comparison is shown in 
Table 4. For the analysis, dependent measures from all the EF tasks were standardized. 
The younger adults significantly outperformed the older adults on all the EF tasks except 
the Go-Nogo task and the Digit Span task (both forward and backward). 
Table 4. Descriptive information and t-test analyses of age-related differences on EF 
tasks. 
 
Younger 
 
Older 
 Group difference  
 M SD 
 
M SD 
 
t df P 
Cohen’
s d 
Inhibition           
Stroop effecta (s) 0.10 0.10  0.22 0.19  -3.64 66.813 .001 -0.89 
Go/No-gob (%) 4.14 2.38  3.53 2.32  1.27 94 .206 0.26 
Updating           
Digit Span: 
Forwardc 
18.80 2.90  18.60 3.72  0.28 95 .777 0.06 
Digit Span: 
Backwardc 
12.10 3.20  11.15 3.57  1.39 95 .168 0.29 
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Shifting           
Digit Symbol 
Substitutionc 
50.76 12.14  34.25 7.65  7.88 75.004 <.001 1.82 
TMT_Bd (s) 57.22 21.35  79.09 31.55  -4.02 96 <.001 -0.82 
WCSTc (%) 76.40 11.48  69.92 12.94  2.60 94 .011 0.54 
a median reaction time (RT) for neutral condition - the median RT for incongruent condition 
b false alarm rate 
c the number of correct answers (cf. Digit Symbol Substitution: within 90 seconds)  
d the total time to complete the part 
5.2.3 Spontaneous belief-reasoning and EF 
As an exploratory analysis, correlation analyses between EF and the looking scores in the 
false belief condition were explored (we thank a reviewer for this recommendation). 
There was no significant correlation between the looking scores in the false belief 
condition and EF (all ps > .10). In addition, the Bayes Factor suggested positive evidence 
for null hypotheses concerning the correlation relative to the alternative: Go-Nogo (BF01 
= 6.231), Stroop (BF01= 4.740), the updating composite score (BF01= 3.593), and the 
shifting composite score (BF01= 7.583), suggesting no significant association between EF 
measurements and false-belief reasoning.  
When correlations between the looking scores in the false belief condition and EF were 
broken down by age group, in the older group, there was no significant correlation 
between the looking scores in the false belief condition and EF (ps > .090) except for the 
updating composite score (r = 0.30, p = .041). In the younger age group, there was no 
significant correlation between the looking scores in the false belief condition and EF (all 
ps >.50).  
However, this analysis should be interpreted with caution for several reasons. First, ToM 
and EF could still be related if other unmeasured variables weaken the relationship or 
even pull the relationship in the other direction, washing out the correlation. Second, 
while a weak or lack of a correlation is consistent with reduced executive demands in the 
spontaneous-response task, a strong correlation would still be consistent with lowered 
executive demands because the claim is not that spontaneous-response tasks eliminate 
executive demands, just that they sufficiently reduce them to reveal underlying 
competence better than their elicited-response task counterparts. 
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5.3 Discussion 
The current study examined whether older adults, known to show age-related decline in 
ToM ability when given tasks that impose high performance demands (Bailey & Henry, 
2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011; Rakoczy et 
al., 2012), would track belief when using a spontaneous-response task that reduced non-
ToM processing. The present finding suggests that older adults track belief when EF 
demands are sufficiently lowered, revealing intact underlying ToM competence in the 
elderly. Although recent work appears to show a similar result (Grainger et al., 2018), 
lack of preregistration and use of p > .05 to argue for no differences in belief tracking 
between younger and older adults limit the validity of those results. The current study 
was preregistered and used Bayesian model comparison to support valid inference. 
This work has several implications. It addresses competence and performance factors in 
ToM processing and aging. The elderly’s intact mentalizing ability in the current study 
implies that the age-related deterioration of ToM that the previous studies have shown 
comes from the elderly’s difficulty in expressing their ToM competence, not from decline 
of ToM competence. This study suggests that EF seems to be the underlying sources of 
age-related deterioration of ToM that the previous literature have shown.  
Several limitations should be considered. First, the older adults in this study had 
relatively higher years of education and WASI scores compared to the younger 
counterparts, so it is possible that their relatively high functioning allowed them to 
compensate for an otherwise reduced ToM capacity in the spontaneous-response ToM 
task (e.g., by using non-mentalistic strategy to predict others’ behavior). Closer matching 
of participants in future research would address this concern. Second, even though 
numerous studies have shown age-related decline of ToM with various elicited-response 
ToM tasks, directly comparing older adults’ performance on elicited-response ToM tasks 
and closely matched spontaneous-response ToM tasks would be necessary to strongly 
claim the existing ToM tasks have heavy EF demands for future studies (cf. Grainger et 
al., 2018). Third, not all agree on how to interpret performance in spontaneous-response 
tasks. This study assumes they tap a conceptual ToM system rather than a “belief-like” or 
non-mentalistic capacity (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Perner & Ruffman, 2005), and 
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although recent work casts doubt on these alternative accounts (e.g., Hyde, Simon, Ting, 
& Nikolaeva, 2018; Király, Oláh, Csibra, & Kovács, 2018), this assumption is still being 
debated and tested. Lastly, although the current study suggests that some aspects of core 
ToM mechanisms are intact in the elderly, ToM involves multiple sub-systems each with 
multiple processes and concepts (Apperly, 2012; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Leslie, 
Friedman, & German, 2004; Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015; Warnell & 
Redcay, 2019) and it is possible that concepts, processes, or sub-systems not engaged by 
the specific task used here are in fact compromised in the elderly. 
This study helps illuminate age-related development of ToM, providing evidence that the 
deterioration of ToM ability with age is caused by changes in EF, not in ToM 
competence. While the competence-performance distinction has long played a role in 
explaining the acquisition of abilities in early development (e.g., Chomsky, 1964), the 
current work shows the distinction can be put to work to explain changes in late 
development as well. 
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Chapter 6  
6 Discussion 
From the standpoint of phylogenetic timescales, there has been an abrupt co-emergence 
of several higher-order cognitive functions. Modern humans and their closest 
evolutionary cousin, the chimpanzee, are thought to share a common evolutionary 
ancestor that existed 5 million and 7 million years ago. In the intervening period, humans 
evolved a suite of higher-order cognitive functions, including language, EF, ToM, and 
symbolizing abilities. Understanding whether one of these functions evolved first and 
served as a foundation for others, or whether different functions developed separately but 
in parallel, is extremely challenging because intermediate phenotypes, such as those of 
Homo erectus and Homo neanderthalensis, no longer exist and cannot easily be 
reconstructed from the archeological record.   
Much the same problem is observed when the emergence of these functions is studied on 
ontogenetic timescales. Across the lifespan, higher-order cognitive functions show 
similar developmental timetables. For example, both ToM and EF rapidly develop within 
the early stage of one’s life, the preschool period (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 
2002; Frye et al., 1995; Hughes & Ensor, 2005), and decline in late-adulthood (German 
& Hehman, 2006; McDowd & Craik, 1988; Phillips et al., 2011; Salthouse & Babcock, 
1991; Verhaeghen et al., 2003). Thus, the analogous developmental trajectories between 
ToM and EF, especially the rapid development of the two abilities in a short period, bring 
challenges to testing the nature of the relationship between the two abilities.  
Three experiments in the current work explored the relationship between ToM and EF 
given challenges to testing the relationship. There were several important findings and 
implications that will be briefly reviewed.      
6.1 Summary of findings 
One empirical challenge to testing the nature of the relationship between ToM and EF is 
that the development timetables of ToM and EF are very similar making it difficult to 
know whether the relationship between the two is causal or merely statistical. To address 
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this challenge, the first two experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) explored whether socio-
cultural influences on EF have comparable effects on ToM. First, given that language 
status (Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Bialystok & Senman, 2004) and country-of-origin (Oh 
& Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh et al., 2006) influence children’s EF, Experiment 1 investigated 
whether the two socio-cultural factors impact preschool-aged children’s EF. To that end, 
Korean-English (K-E) bilingual, Korean monolingual, and English monolingual 
preschool-aged children were compared on an age-appropriate response inhibition task. 
The results demonstrated that both K-E bilinguals and Korean monolinguals 
outperformed English monolinguals in the task, implying that country-of-origin, but not 
language status, affects young children’s inhibitory control.  
Experiment 2 explored whether the effects reported in Experiment 1 extended to ToM. 
To that end, the performance of identical samples reported in Experiment 1 on two 
typically used false-belief tasks was compared. The results showed that there was no 
difference among the three groups in their performance on the ToM tasks, suggesting that 
neither country-of-origin nor language status influences preschool-aged children’s ToM. 
In other words, the effect of country-of-origin observed in Experiment 1 (EF) was not 
found in Experiment 2 (ToM). 
Another empirical challenge to testing the relationship between ToM and EF is that the 
strong relationship between the two abilities might actually come from methodological 
artifacts. For example, high cognitive loads that ToM tasks typically impose to perform 
might make the two abilities appear to be strongly correlated. To address this issue, 
Experiment 3 examined whether older adults, believed to have age-related decline of 
ToM due to their deficits in EF with age (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton et al., 2009; 
German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011), show difficulty in tracking others’ 
beliefs even when using a ToM task with a reduced cognitive load. To that end, young 
adults and older adults were compared on a spontaneous-response ToM task (which 
requires low cognitive load to perform) and a variety of EF measurements. The results 
exhibited that older adults tracked belief to same extent as young adults when cognitive 
demands in a ToM task were reduced, in spite of their deficits in EF. It suggests that 
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correlations between ToM and EF performance might be artificially increased due to the 
high cognitive demands that most of ToM tasks impose. 
6.2 Implications on the relationship between Theory of 
Mind and Executive Function 
Regarding the relationship between ToM and EF, two possibilities have been proposed: 
(1) ToM and EF are two facets of the same process; (2) ToM and EF are distinct (but 
coincidently developed) processes. In regard to the first possibility, ToM (specifically, 
false-belief understanding) has been suggested to be merely one form of EF using higher-
order rules (e.g., Cognitive Complexity and Control theory; Frye et al., 1998). According 
to this idea, it may be possible that a common domain-general process is involved in both 
the response inhibition task used in Experiment 1 and the false-belief tasks used in 
Experiment 2. For example, to successfully perform the false-belief tasks, the ability to 
switch judgments using if-if-then rules (e.g., if a character in the tasks saw that an object 
was located in A, if  he/she did not see the change of the object’s location (from location 
A to location B), then location A; if  he/she saw that an object was located in A, if  he/she 
saw the change of the object’s location to B, then location B) might be involved. 
Likewise, the identical reasoning ability to switch judgments might be necessary for 
successfully performing the response inhibition task (e.g., if it is an incongruent 
condition, if a computer says “red”, then pressing a blue circle; if it is a congruent 
condition, if a computer says “red”, then pressing a red circle). If ToM and EF are based 
on the same cognitive process (e.g., using if-if-then rules), advance in one ability (e.g., 
EF) should lead to advance in the other ability (e.g., ToM). The results from Experiments 
1 and 2, however, challenge the first possibility in that differences in response inhibition 
associated with country-of-origin did not extend to differences in performance on ToM 
tasks.  
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 seem to support the second possibility in that the 
analogous effects of sociocultural factors (i.e., country-of-origin and language status) on 
EF (reported in Experiment 1) did not extend to ToM. In addition, previous findings 
(Sabbagh et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2016) add weight to this possibility. For example, 
Chinese preschoolers outperformed U.S. counterparts on a variety of EF measurements, 
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but were indistinguishable from U.S. children on several ToM tasks, suggesting that 
differences in EF possibly associated with country-of-origin do not extend to differences 
in ToM (Sabbagh et al., 2006). 
If the second possibility is correct, however, it is still complicated to explain the myriad 
of evidence showing the strong correlation between ToM and EF (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 
2001; Frye et al., 1995; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; McAlister & Peterson, 2013). If ToM and 
EF are distinct processes, why are EF and ToM measures frequently correlated? The 
results of Experiment 3 offer one possibility. 
In Experiment 3, older adults with their age-related deterioration of EF showed intact 
belief-tracking ability when using a low-demand ToM. Given that (1) the age-related 
decline of ToM is attributable to the age-related deterioration of EF (Bailey & Henry, 
2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011) and (2) ToM 
tasks typically require high cognitive demands to perform (i.e., elicited-response tasks), 
the results suggest that high cognitive load that the elicited-response tasks impose might 
be the underlying sources of age-related decline of ToM that previous literature has 
reported. Thus, the results from Experiment 3 support the possibility that methodological 
artifacts lead to a seemingly interdependent but, in truth, independent relationship 
between ToM and EF. 
Regarding how EF relates to ToM (i.e., emergence5 and expression accounts), the results 
from experiments 1 and 2 do not seem to support the expression account whereas the 
result from experiment 3 does. Under the expression account, it is predicted that (1) an 
advance in EF (in other words, an advance in the ability to express one’s mentalizing 
ability) should lead to an advance in ToM task performance and (2) lowering EF 
demands of a ToM task should lead to increased or intact ToM ability in the elderly. 
Although the results from the experiment 3 seems to be consistent with this prediction, 
 
5
 Since the current work did not involve a longitudinal design or training effect, it is not possible to 
conclude anything about a causal relationship between ToM and EF (i.e., whether EF is necessary for ToM) 
from the current work.  
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the results from experiments 1 and 2 do not seem to favour this account in that it showed 
that Korean children’s earlier development of EF did not extend to parallel advantage in 
ToM compared to Canadian children. The inconsistent findings on the expression account 
might come from the limitations of the current work, which will be addressed in the 
following section. 
6.3 Limitations and future directions 
The purpose of the current work is to examine whether ToM and EF stem from one 
process or are distinct processes, but there are limitations in addressing this question.   
One limitation is that it was not possible to directly test whether socio-cultural variables 
(i.e., language status and country-of-origin) are differently related to ToM than EF 
through Experiments 1 and 2. In both experiments, there was a lack of bilingual samples 
from individualistic cultures (e.g., French-English bilingual children in Canada). As such, 
these incomplete 2 (language status: bilinguals vs. monolinguals) x 2 (country-of-origin: 
collectivistic vs. individualistic) factorial designs did not allow us to disentangle the 
effects of the two socio-cultural variables on ToM and EF respectively, and to see 
whether there is the possible interaction of language status and country-of-origin on ToM 
and EF.  
Future studies are, therefore, necessary to elucidate the impact of socio-cultural variables 
on ToM and EF, both independently and collectively. Specifically, future work should 
aim to collect an equal amount of data from individualistic and collectivist countries, 
allowing for a complete 2 x 2 factorial design in one analysis/study. This will enable 
researchers to directly compare the magnitude of the socio-cultural effects on ToM and 
EF. In addition, a longitudinal study with complete 2 x 2 factorial designs potentially 
allows us to test not only whether the possible interaction exists but also whether 
individual differences in one ability (e.g., EF) associated with socio-cultural variables are 
related to individual differences in the other ability (e.g., ToM) later in development. 
Interestingly, the results from experiments 1 and 2 suggest that sociocultural factor (i.e., 
country-of-origin) influences EF but not ToM, which may seem counterintuitive. For 
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example, ToM involves one’s understanding of how others think so that it is highly likely 
to be influenced by socialization and cultures, but which is not true in the current results. 
The present work attempted to clarify the nature of the sociocultural factor (i.e., country-
of-origin) by using questionnaires on parental cultural values and parenting styles, but it 
is still unclear. For future studies, it would be interesting to investigate what factor leads 
to the observed sociocultural effect on EF but not on ToM by encompassing a variety of 
sociocultural measurements.  
Although the present work proposes methodological artifacts as a possible basis 
underlying the seemingly correlated relationship between ToM and EF, it is difficult to 
say that the results from Experiment 3 can be direct evidence of supporting this 
possibility. Experiment 3 was lacking in direct comparisons of performance between 
closely matched ToM tasks with higher cognitive demands and ToM tasks with lower 
cognitive demands. As such, it was not directly tested whether the relationship between 
ToM and EF is dependent on the extent of cognitive demand that a ToM task imposes to 
perform. To that end, a more direct comparison would enable us to draw better 
conclusions about whether or not a highly interrelated relationship between ToM and EF 
comes from the incidental EF loads that ToM tasks require to perform. This should be 
further addressed in future studies.  
One limitation relating to the false-belief eye-tracking task used in Experiment 3 is that 
there have been controversies on whether spontaneous-response behaviour (i.e., eye 
movement) can be interpreted as indicative of false-belief understanding. On one hand, it 
has been proposed that spontaneous-response behaviour can be regarded as evidence 
showing the innateness or early onset of ToM competence (Leslie et al., 2004; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005). On the other hand, it is suggested that spontaneous-response 
behaviour can be explained by behavioural rules (e.g., people are more likely to search 
for an object where they last saw it; Perner & Ruffman, 2005) or actor-object-location 
associations (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). Thus, this issue should 
be explored further by future work.    
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Conceptual issues relating to the definitions of ToM and EF should also be considered. 
For example, ToM has been proposed to encompass a variety of domains (i.e., cognitive 
vs. affective ToM; Kalbe et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007 or implicit 
vs. explicit ToM; Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, & 
Steinbeis, 2017) and levels (i.e., first-order or second-order false-belief reasoning; 
Apperly, Samson, Carroll, Hussain, & Humphreys, 2006; Lecce, Bianco, Demicheli, & 
Cavallini, 2014) of ToM. In regard to EF, it is difficult to define because (1) EF is an 
umbrella term to include a variety of cognitive processes (i.e., inhibitory control, working 
memory updating, set-shifting) for goal-directed behaviour and (2) there is no consensus 
on the definition EF (Barkley, 2001, 2012). Therefore, it is possible that the relationship 
between ToM and EF might be dependent on the definitions or types of ToM and EF. For 
example, other subcomponents of EF (i.e., set-shifting and working memory updating) 
might have a bidirectional relationship with ToM, whereas inhibitory control might not 
have any bidirectionality with ToM (Austin et al., 2014). The relationship between ToM 
and EF should be explored further by future studies, which focus on encompassing 
diverse domains and types of ToM and EF.  
Neuroscience methods may provide deeper insight into the relationship between ToM 
and EF given the limitations of behavioural evidence (e.g., mixed results even with 
sophisticated study designs; Wade et al., 2018). Based on a few existing neuroscience 
findings (Saxe et al., 2006; Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, & Saxe, 
2009; van der Meer et al., 2011), the proposal of a completely overlapping relationship 
between ToM and EF can be ruled out (Wade et al., 2018) because separable neural 
mechanisms underlying ToM and EF (but with some shared brain areas involving both 
ToM and EF) have been found. The current work seems to be consistent with the 
neuroscience findings in that the results from Experiments 1 and 2 do not support the 
possibility of one common process underlying both ToM and EF. Even with existing 
neuroscience findings, however, it is still uncertain whether ToM and EF are distinct 
processes and whether the shared neural mechanisms are attributable to incidental 
cognitive (or domain-general) demands that both ToM and EF tasks impose. Further 
neuroscience works may explore this possibility with various approaches (e.g., functional 
connectivity between ToM and EF) in the future.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
The current work tested hypotheses concerning the relationship between ToM and EF by 
conducting three interrelated experiments. The results suggest that: (1) ToM and EF are 
distinct processes; and (2) methodological overlap between ToM and EF tasks might 
inflate apparent correlations between ToM and EF abilities. Given that the similar 
developmental trajectories between ToM and EF are one of the key empirical challenges 
to elucidate the nature of relationship, the current work provides meaningful 
contributions in that it suggests a new framework to investigate the relationship, 
examining whether the effects of individual differences in socio-cultural factors on EF 
extend to ToM. The current work provides not only important contributions to 
understanding the nature of the relationship between ToM and EF, but insight into our 
understanding of higher cognitive functions in terms of evolutionary perspectives.  
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Appendix B. Language status and demographics survey used in experiments 1 and 2  
 
The questions below will be about YOUR CHILD.  
1. The date of your child’s birth 
Month:________________________  Day:______________________  Year:_______________________ 
 
2.  Your child’s gender 
(1) Female 
(2) Male 
 
3. What is your child’s first language (i.e., the language your child find easiest to 
speak, read, and write)? 
(1) English 
(2) French 
(3) Korean 
(4) Chinese 
(5) Spanish 
(6) Other: (specify:_______________________________________) 
 
4. Does your child speak, read, or write other languages? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
5. Which one(s)? 
(1) English 
(2) French 
(3) Korean 
(4) Chinese 
(5) Spanish 
(6) Other: (specify:_____________________________________) 
 
6. What language does your child use when s/he is: 
6a. With his/her family (i.e., parents, siblings, grandparents, etc.)? 
(1) Only his/her first language 
(2) Mostly his/her first language 
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages 
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(4) Mostly his/her other language(s) 
(5) Only his/her other language(s) 
 
6b. With his/her friends? 
(1) Only his/her first language 
(2) Mostly his/her first language 
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages 
(4) Mostly his/her other language(s) 
(5) Only his/her other language(s) 
 
6c. At preschool or day-care?  
(1) Only his/her first language 
(2) Mostly his/her first language 
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages 
(4) Mostly his/her other language(s) 
(5) Only his/her other language(s) 
 
6d. Watching TV/movies? 
(1) Only his/her first language 
(2) Mostly his/her first language 
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages 
(4) Mostly his/her other language(s) 
(5) Only his/her other language(s) 
 
6e. Counting or doing math in his/her mind? 
(1) Only his/her first language 
(2) Mostly his/her first language 
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages 
(4) Mostly his/her other language(s) 
(5) Only his/her other language(s) 
 
7. How many languages does your child speak? 
(1) One 
(2) Two 
(3) More than two 
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8. (only if you say “yes” to Question 3) Out of the day, the proportion of your child’s 
using his/her first language is approximately (                              %) and the 
proportion of using his/her other language(s) is approximately (                       %).  
*The total two proportions should be 100%. 
 
9. How many brothers and sisters does your child have? 
(1) None                                                (5) Four 
(2) One                                                   (6) Five 
(3) Two                                                  (7) more than 5 
(4) Three   
If your child has siblings, please specify (i.e., s/he has one younger sister and one 
older brother): 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The questions below will be about You and Your Spouse (child’s parents).  
 
10. Do you and your spouse (your child’s parents) live together or are you 
separated? 
(1) Live together 
(2) Separated 
 
11. Do you and your spouse work? 
(1) Yes, both work 
(2) No, only 1 parent works 
(3) No, neither of us work 
 
12. What do you and your spouse do for a living? 
 
You: Business owner, Business manager, Office administrator, Engineer/Architect, 
Artist/Designer, Entertainer, Media/Communications, Computers/Programmer, 
Agricultural/Fisheries (farmer, fisher, etc), Cleaning/Maintenance services, 
Scientist, Civilian military officer, Soldier & Veterans, Medical 
practitioner/technician, Medical support, Community/Social services, Law 
enforcement/Security (e.g., firefighter, police officer), Legal services, Educator, 
Transportation services, Personal care/services (e.g., hairstylist), Salesperson, 
Professor, Food services, Manufacturing/Factory employee, Construction, 
Homemaker, Government  
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If your occupation is not included in these categories, please specify your 
occupation: 
                                                                                           . 
 
Your spouse: Business owner, Business manager, Office administrator, 
Engineer/Architect, Artist/Designer, Entertainer, Media/Communications, 
Computers/Programmer, Agricultural/Fisheries (farmer, fisher, etc), 
Cleaning/Maintenance services, Scientist, Civilian military officer, Soldier & 
Veterans, Medical practitioner/technician, Medical support, Community/Social 
services, Law enforcement/Security (e.g., firefighter, police officer), Legal services, 
Educator, Transportation services, Personal care/services (e.g., hairstylist), 
Salesperson, Professor, Food services, Manufacturing/Factory employee, 
Construction, Homemaker, Government  
 
If your spouse’s occupation is not included in these categories, please specify 
his/her occupation: 
                                                                                           . 
 
13. Compared to other families in the country you live in, how much money does 
your family have? 
 
(1) Not very much   
(2) Less than average, but we are not poor 
(3) About the same as an average family  
(4) More than the average family  
(5) My family is very wealthy 
 
14. What is the highest form of education you and your spouse received? 
You: No education; Elementary school; High school; College; University 
(Undergraduate); University (Medicine); University (Graduate) 
 
Your spouse: No education; Elementary school; High school; College/Professional 
School; University (Undergraduate); University (Medicine); University (Graduate) 
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Appendix C. Individualism-Collectivism survey used in experiments 1 and 2  
 
Please read the instructions carefully and answer the questions as spontaneously as possible 
using a 9-point. There are no right or wrong answers; we simply ask that you be completely 
honest in your responses.  
 
1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
       Never or                                                                                                                              Always or  
     definitely No                                                                                                                        definitely Yes 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I’d rather depend on myself than others.          
It is important that I do my job better than 
others.  
         
If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.           
Parents and children must stay together as 
much as possible.  
         
I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely 
on others.  
         
Winning is everything.           
The well-being of my coworkers is important 
to me.  
         
It is my duty to take care of my family, even 
when I have to sacrifice what I want.  
         
I often do my own thing.           
Competition is the law of nature.           
To me, pleasure is spending time with others.           
Family members should stick together, no 
matter what sacrifices are required.  
         
My personal identity, independent of others, is 
very important to me.  
         
Some people emphasize winning; I am not one 
of them.  
         
I feel good when I cooperate with others.           
It is important to me that I respect the 
decisions made by my groups.  
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Being a unique individual is important to me.           
When another person does better than I do, I 
get tense and aroused.  
         
If a relative were in financial difficulty, I 
would help within my means. 
         
Children should be taught to place duty before 
pleasure.  
         
I enjoy working in situations involving 
competition.  
         
It is important to me to maintain harmony in 
my group.  
         
I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the 
benefit of my group. 
         
Without competition, it is not possible to have 
a good society.  
         
I like sharing little things with my neighbors.           
It annoys me when other people perform better 
than I do.  
         
My happiness depends very much on the 
happiness of those around me.  
         
 
1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
       Never or                                                                                                                              Always or  
     definitely No                                                                                                                        definitely Yes 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix D. Authoritative and authoritarian parenting attitudes survey used in 
experiments 1 and 2 
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Appendix E. A letter on permission to use copyrighted material for experiment 3 
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Appendix F. Documentation of ethics approval for experiment 3 
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